South Africa's headquarter company regime: a gateway barred from within by Mukumba, Tsangadzaome A
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
i 
 
 
 
 
 
South Africa’s   He dquarter 
Company Regime: 
A Gateway Barred from Within 
 
Tsangadzaome A. Mukumba 
 
 
Supervisor: Tracy Gutuza 
 
  
     University of Cape Town 
     Faculty of Law 
   
    
 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 
of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. 
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DECLARATION 
 
I declare that the thesis for the degree of Master of Laws at the University of 
Cape Town, hereby submitted, has not been previously submitted for a degree at 
this or any other university, that it is my own work in design and execution, and 
that all the materials contained herein have been duly acknowledged. 
 
 
_________________________________                    _____________________ 
Tsangadzaome Mukumba                                             13 March 2017 
 
 
 
  
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
This paper aims to determine whether South Africa’s section 9I headquarter company regime is fit for 
the purpose of incentivising multi-national enterprises to locate strategically beneficial activities in 
South Africa.  
Part I investigates the tax policy appropriateness of s9I in the context of a developing, but regionally 
dominant South Africa. It finds that the passive intermediary holding company activities in fact 
incentivised by s9I are not directly beneficial to South Africa. While the active functions associated 
with true headquarter companies would produce the positive externalities needed by South Africa. 
Given the regional competition in this arena and strategic advantages in South Africa Part I advocates 
the incentivisation of regional headquarter companies, specifically regional treasury companies, as 
the most appropriate policy choice. 
Part II interprets the provisions of s9I regime to determine their effect on its commercial attractiveness. 
The analysis covers both the interpretation of the relevant provisions under South African tax law and 
the place of s9I in the broader legal atmosphere. It is determined that due to an overemphasis on 
restricting the activities of prospective s9I companies and preventing the erosion of the tax base, the 
provisions of the regime themselves undermine its commercial attractiveness.  
The ultimate conclusion reached here is that although South Africa is indeed poised to be the natural 
gateway into Africa, the s9I regime is both inappropriately designed and unattractive to prospective 
multi-nationals looking to enter the region. Therefore, if the regime adopts the ‘effective, reliable tax 
relief for strategic local substance’ model of incentivisation South Africa can still reap the benefits of 
direct investment by MNEs.  
iv 
 
Contents: 
INTRODUCTION 
…………………………………………………..……………..………...............1 
PART I : LOCATIONAL INCENTIVE SCHEME COMPARATIVE STUDY & 
S9I’S TAX POLICY APPROPRIATENESS ..…………………………………4 
2.1 Introduction …………..……………………………………………..............4 
2.2 The Netherlands as an Intermediary Holding Company Jurisdiction 
……………………………………………………………………………………..6 
2.3 Singapore’s Regional Headquarter Company Incentive 
Schemes…………………………………………………….... ………………..17 
2.4 Contemporary Regional Competition …………………. ……………….30 
2.5 Conclusion on the Tax Policy Appropriateness of s9I ………………....35 
 
PART II: THE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 9I AND ITS COMMERCIAL 
ATTRACTIVENESS  
3.1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………..….38 
3.2 Section 9I (2)(a): the ‘10per cent equity shares and voting rights’ 
requirement…………………………………………………… …………….…40 
3.3 Section 9I (2)(b): the ‘80per cent of cost of total assets attributable to’ 
requirement ……………………………………………….……………………46 
3.4 The Annual Election & Section 9H …………….……………………...….61 
3.5 Section 9I’s Interaction with Double Tax Agreements, Foreign Tax Systems & 
Exchange 
Control………………………………………………….…….……………….…66 
3.6 Assessment of s9I’s Commercial Attractiveness ………………………71 
Conclusion……………………………………………………………. ………. 
v 
 
Abbreviations Used: 
ANC                              The African National Congress 
AHCA                              Approved Headquarter Company Award 
ASEAN                          Association of South East Asian Nations 
CFC                               Controlled Foreign Company 
DTA or treaty                 Double Taxation Agreement 
EDB                                Economic Development Board 
The Act or ITA               Income Tax Act 52 of 1958 
IFSC                               International Financial Services Centre 
GBC 1                            Global Business Corporation 1 
IHC                                Intermediary Holding Company 
IN87                               Interpretation Note No. 87 
LIS                                 Location Incentive Scheme 
MNE                              Multinational Enterprises 
OECD                       Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OHC                              Operational Headquarter Company  
TLAA 2010                    Taxation Laws Amendment Act 7 of 2010 
TLAA 2011                     Taxation Laws Amendment Act 24 of 2011 
TLAA 2012                     Taxation Laws Amendment Act 22 of 2012 
RHQ                                Regional Headquarter Company 
RTC                                 Regional Treasury Company 
SAB                                South African Breweries Pty 
SABMiller                        SABMiller International BV 
SARS                              South African Revenue Service 
s9I co Section 9I Company 
YOA                                Year of Assessment 
 
vi 
 
List of Tables: 
Table 1: Comparison Between s9I, GBL 1 & IFSC 
Table 2: Withholding Rates for Major African Economies 
Table 3: Withholding Rates for Major Global Economies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION  
1.1. The fall of apartheid brought a fervour to South Africa; the hearts of its people running over 
with the triumph of democracy and newfound hope of reconciliation. The passing of more 
than twenty years without sufficient, tangible progress for much of South Africa has seen 
these passions dampened. It is becoming increasingly evident that without socio-economic 
emancipation for the black majority the true victories of human dignity and equality will 
remain elusive. It is therefore imperative for the democratically elected government to push a 
developmental agenda which will bring about real change for the poor and disenfranchised 
caught in the wake of apartheid.1  
 
1.2. The African National Congress (‘ANC’) led government in recent years has chosen the 
developmental state as the means to take South Africa forward. It is generally accepted within 
this paradigm that inclusive economic growth facilitated by the state is essential to achieve 
much needed social progress.2 However, the path to this end for South Africa and the best 
choice of policy vehicle to traverse it remain far from clear. Taxation and broader economic 
regulation have often been favoured as tools with which governments can engineer change in 
economic circumstance and behaviour towards given policy goals. The ANC led government 
has been no different and boldly states that it intends to ‘build a developmental state which 
will intervene in the economy in favour of labour and the poor’.3  
 
1.3. National Treasury in the Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 
2010 declared that South Africa’s location, sizable economy, political stability, overall 
strength in financial services and network of tax treaties make it the natural holding company 
gateway into the region.4 It therefore set out to encourage Parliament to enact a regime which 
                                            
1 ss 7 (2), 9 & 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
2 Omano Edigheji ‘Constructing a democratic developmental state in South Africa: Potentials and 
Challenges’ in Omano Edigheji (ed) Constructing a democratic developmental state in South Africa: 
Potentials and Challenges (2010) 1– 2.  
3 African National Congress ‘Election Manifesto: Together We Move South Africa Forward’ (2014) 7. 
4 National Treasury of the Republic of South Africa ‘Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws 
Amendment Bill, 2010’ (2010) 77; The Word Economic Forum rates South Africa’s financial sector’s 
competitiveness at 5.2 out of 7 and 11th out of 140 countries, see further Klaus Schwab (ed) World 
Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2016- 2017 (2016) 325.  
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would remove tax as a barrier to such company structures. The intention was to ensure 
obstacles, in the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (‘the Act’ or ‘ITA’), to South Africa taking its 
place as the gateway into Africa were removed. The barriers initially identified were: the 
controlled foreign company (‘CFC’) regime, thin capitalisation rules and the taxation of cross 
border dividend and interest payments.5 The proposed relief would allow subsidiaries of 
qualifying headquarter companies to avoid being subject to CFC rules merely due to a 
majority shareholding, avoid dividends tax in the form of Secondary Tax on Companies and 
benefit from relaxed application of the arm’s length principle for conduit, cross border loans.6 
 
1.4. The current manifestation of South Africa’s headquarter company regime was first enacted 
through the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 7 of 2010 (‘TLAA 2010’). The nature of the 
regional holding/headquarter company intervention evolved over the following years. The 
regime began life centred around the definition of ‘Headquarter company’ in s1, which 
provided the criteria for qualifying companies.7 The relief mentioned above, as well as 
provisions on exchange gains, operated through exclusions in the relevant sections of the Act.8 
The Taxation Laws Amendment Act 24 of 2011 (‘TLAA 2011’) saw the enactment of s9I as 
the functional core of the regime, with less stringent requirements for qualification.9 Further, 
Parliament dealt with the anomaly of unsolicited headquarter company status by introducing 
an annual election and an exit/entrance tax into the regime to prevent erosion of the pre-
existing tax base.10 The Tax Laws Amendment Act 22 of 2012 (‘TLAA 2012’) saw further 
                                            
5 National Treasury (note 3) 77-8. 
6 Ibid 77-80. 
7 s6(1)(o) Taxation Laws Amendment Act 7 of 2010. 
8 For example, s16 of the TLAA 2010 enacted the headquarter company exceptions s9D of the ITA, 
the foreign currency relief found in s24I(1) and s25D(4) of the ITA was enacted through s47(1) and 
s50 (1) of the TLAA 2010 and exemption from the forthcoming dividends tax found in s64E(1) of the 
ITA was enacted through s71(1) of the TLAA 2010. 
9 s21(1) Taxation Laws Amendment Act 24 of 2011; For example, the minimum equity share and 
voting right requirement found in s9(2)(a) was reduced from 20per cent to 10per cent and s9I(2)(b) 
was relaxed by excluding cash holdings from total assets.  
10 National Treasury of the Republic of South Africa ‘Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws 
Amendment Bill, 2011’ (2011) 92-3; s26 & s 27 TLAA 2011, which enacted s9I (3) and s9H ITA 
respectively. 
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relaxation of the requirements and brought in relief for intellectual property/royalty flow 
through – similar to the treatment of flow through debt finance.11  
 
1.5. The aim of this paper is to determine whether the headquarter company regime amendments, 
enacted at the impetus of National Treasury, live up to their stated intention of providing a 
viable gateway into the region. They must simultaneously satisfy the developmental 
imperative, which is necessarily a consideration in the post-apartheid economic policy. The 
route chosen for this enquiry is two-fold and can be summarised as: 1) whether the s9I regime 
is appropriate for South Africa’s present context from a tax policy perspective; and 2) whether 
the provisions of s9I regime provide a commercially viable structure, which would likely be 
attractive to Multinational Enterprises (MNE). 
 
1.6. In pursuit of an answer to the above, Part I investigates the nature of the various tax based 
incentivisation schemes aimed at influencing MNEs’ choice to use a form of holding company 
structure or establish a headquarter company in a particular jurisdiction. This will provide the 
means to determine if the s9I regime conforms with contemporary best practice and is 
competitive with existing regimes. More importantly, it will provide an answer on whether 
the s9I regime is in sync with broader government policy.12 This would be so if it targets the 
kind of MNE activity which is most beneficial to grass roots economic development of the 
people of South Africa.  
 
1.7. Part II looks at the actual workings of the legislative provisions, because the likelihood that 
MNEs will opt into the s9I regime in the first instance depends on the reliability of accessing 
its benefits. While cognisant that tax is only one factor in the structuring decisions of MNEs, 
companies are unlikely to attempt to make use of the s9I regime if they cannot reliably predict 
whether they will comply with its requirements and therefore are unsure if they will benefit 
from its protection. An interpretative examination of s9I will elucidate the precarious nature 
of compliance with its requirements. Furthermore, the s9I regime’s success is dependent on 
legal factors outside the ITA including the value of South Africa’s network of double taxation 
                                            
11 s64(1)(d) Taxation Laws Amendment Act 22 of 2012. 
12 The key policy documents of the government at the time include the National Planning Committee 
‘National Development Plan 2030: Our Future – Make it Work’ (2012) and Ministry for Economic 
Development ‘Framework on the New Economic Growth Path’ (2010).  
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agreements to the holding chains it encourages and the role played by exchange control. The 
above factors will be analysed to determine if the regime, in its broader legal context, presents 
a useful tool to optimise MNEs’ regional activities.  
 
1.8. The essence of the question posed by this work can be reduced to: whether the s9I regime is 
fit for purpose. The answer will be positive if it in fact, positions South Africa as an 
appropriately designed and commercially attractive gateway into and, perhaps unfortunately, 
out of Southern Africa and Africa more broadly. 
PART I: LOCATION INCENTIVE SCHEME COMPARATIVE STUDY & S9I’S TAX 
POLICY APPROPRIATENESS 
2.1. Introduction 
2.1.1 The predominance and new-found mobility of the multinational enterprise in the most recent 
period of globalisation have created an atmosphere of competition among nation states. States 
compete for MNEs to locate various aspects of their activities, including investment holdings, 
manufacturing and management, within their borders. The positive externalities or indirect 
benefits of hosting MNE activities, such as increased employment and revenue, are major 
influences on states’ economic regulation.13 Many states have attempted to encourage MNEs 
to locate certain activities within their borders through legislative and other rules aimed at 
making their jurisdiction the most favourable for those activities. The broad range of state 
interventions aimed at attracting MNEs are what I will refer to as location incentive schemes 
(‘LIS’). The critical criterion in assessing the success of a LIS is its ability to attract MNE 
activities which produce the externalities targeted by the particular state. This is determined 
by appropriateness of the design of the LIS and its ability to compete on the global stage. 
 
2.1.2 The s9I headquarter company regime is an example of a LIS aimed at attracting MNE 
activities into South Africa’s jurisdiction by providing a tax efficient means to finance foreign 
subsidiaries and repatriate of proceeds to foreign parent companies. While the Explanatory 
Memoranda to the various Taxation Laws Amendment Bills dealing with the s9I regime 
clearly state that it is intended to facilitate holding companies, s9I is titled ‘Headquarter 
                                            
13  Richard N. Watanabe ‘Developing Taiwan into a Regional Finance and Operations Centre: A 
Taxation Perspective’ (1998) 8 Revenue Law Journal 88 at 89; Simon Avenell ‘Competition for 
Corporate Regional Headquarters’ (1996) 67 Asia Research Centre Working Paper 8. 
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Companies’. Headquarter company is a defined term in the ITA and references throughout 
the Act are to headquarter companies.14 This is consistent with the assertion by several authors 
that the naming of the regime was misplaced and that it is in fact an intermediary holding 
company regime.15 We can only speculate as to whether this misnomer was a result of the 
evolution of the regime from its intended beginnings as a regional holding company regime.16  
 
2.1.3 The insertion of s31(5) as amended provides for the flow-through and repatriation of 
intellectual property/royalties, allowing the claim that s9I is  also an intellectual property 
holding LIS.17 Furthermore, the absence of thin capitalisation rules, freedom to select 
functional currency and favourable provisions regarding exchange gains or losses, allow for 
holding activates which lean towards group treasury companies.18 Through this 
encouragement of these specialised holding activities, National Treasury has demonstrated a 
push towards allowing a more all-encompassing regime. Perhaps driven by the belief that a 
wide gateway, broad enough to accommodate any special purpose vehicle, would be the most 
attractive to MNEs. 
 
2.1.4 Regardless of the correct title for the regime, what type of MNE activities the s9I regime is in 
fact designed to facilitate is important for determining what the likely externalities will be and 
whether it is competitively positioned to attract them. While intermediary holding and 
headquarter companies may incorporate elements of one another, the distinction between their 
respective core functions remains valid.19 Given that different holding functions have specific 
                                            
14 National Treasury (note 3) 77-8; National Treasury (note 9) 92; s1 ’Headquarter Company’, s9I, 
s9H, s31(5), para 64B (1) of Eight Schedule of Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
15 Annet Wanyana Oguttu ‘Developing South Africa as a Gateway for Foreign Investment in Africa: A 
critique of South Africa’s Headquarter Company Regime’ (2011) 36 South African Yearbook of 
International Law 61 at 90; Tracy Gutuza ‘The Headquarter Company Structure in the Southern African 
Context: A South African Tax Law Perspective’ (2014) XLVII Comparative and International Law 
Journal of Southern Africa 187 at 191. 
16 National Treasury ‘Media Statement: Taxation Laws Amendment Bills 2010’ at 3, available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2010/2010051001.pdf, accessed on 2 February 2017.  
17 s 57 Taxation Laws Amendment Act 24 of 2011 and s 64 (1) (d) of Taxation Laws Amendment Act 
22 of 2012. 
18 See sections 31(5), 25D and 24I Income Tax Act 
19 Oguttu (note 14) at 90 
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related activities, requiring different manifestations in a host jurisdictions; a functional 
distinction allows for a deductive analysis of the likely benefits for South Africa. A 
comparative analysis between the s9I regime and LISs aimed at the corresponding company 
types will be used to investigate which of the abovementioned holding company functions s9I 
is the most amenable to incentivising. Its exhibition of the virtues of an intermediary holding 
or headquarter company LIS, cognisant of the web of non-tax factors at play, will be indicative 
how s9I will be able to compete with contemporary LISs in African countries. 
 
2.2 The Netherlands as an Intermediary Holding Company Jurisdiction 
 
2.2.1 Honiball and Olivier define an intermediary holding company (‘IHC’) as one which has as its 
main function the holding and administration of investments in group companies.20 The 
intermediary nature of the company lies in its interposition in an ownership chain between a 
parent company and the IHC’s own subsidiaries, all of which are often in different 
jurisdictions. In these ownership chains the IHC acts as a conduit for the cross-border flow of 
finance or intellectual property to operating subsidiaries and the repatriation of profit to the 
parent company. IHCs here will be treated as including companies which have as a major 
function the conduit, flow-through or back-to-back, cross border licencing of intellectual 
property and debt financing. This treatment is due to the similarity in the treatment of 
equity/dividends, licencing/royalties and debt/interest under the s9I regime.21 Furthermore, 
these functions are often combined in a single holding entity in practice.22 
 
2.2.2 The very requirements for access to the s9I regime and its benefits lend themselves to IHCs 
acting as conduits for operational finance and profit repatriation. A company wishing to make 
use of s9I must, under s9I(2)(b), have 80per cent of the cost of its assets attributable to equity, 
debt or intellectual property licenced to a foreign company where the IHC holds more than 
10per cent of the equity shares and voting rights. Under s9I(2)(c), a s9I beneficiary with an 
                                            
20 Michael Honiball & Lynette Olivier International Tax: A South African Perspective 5 ed (2011) 690. 
21 For example, royalties, interest and dividends flowing through a s9I company are all excluded from 
withholding taxes under s49D, s50D(1)(a)(i)(cc), s64E(1) of the Income Tax Act. 
22 Honiball & Olivier (note 19) 692; Francis Weyzig International Finance and Tax Avoidance via Dutch 
Special Purpose Entities (Paper for presentation at research seminar, Radboud University Nijmegen, 
21 October 2013) 10. 
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annual turnover of more than R5 million must have at least 50per cent of its gross income 
attributable to proceeds from or on the disposal of the above investments in similarly 
qualifying foreign companies. The benefits available under the regime are designed for use 
by an intermediary holding company acting as a conduit. This is because it allows for flow-
through finance from parent companies to operational subsidiaries and exempts s9I companies 
(‘s9I co’) from withholding taxes on certain transfers to a parent company.23 For example, s9I 
cos can access an exemption from the arm’s length principle in s31 for financial assistance 
received from a non-resident and transferred to a qualifying foreign company; a typical 
example of conduit loan financing.24 Therefore, a company seeking to benefit from s9I must 
be intermediary in nature and hold significant investments in qualifying foreign companies; 
falling squarely within the above definition.    
 
2.2.3 The key determinants of a jurisdiction’s suitability for hosting intermediary holding 
companies, from a tax perspective, centre on the ability for IHCs located there to finance 
foreign operating subsidiaries’ activities and repatriate profits to its foreign parent company 
in a tax efficient manner. At the core of this is the ability to minimise or avoid withholding 
taxes in both the source countries and the IHC’s residence country.25 This can be achieved 
unilaterally through provisions in a LIS or it could be a result of the tax rates imposed under 
a Double Tax Agreement (‘DTA’ or ‘treaty’). IHCs are an important element in the intentional 
exploitation of treaty benefits which has been dubbed ‘treaty shopping’. Treaty shopping is 
found where IHCs are incorporated in third countries, mainly to take advantage of DTA based 
withholding tax rates that are preferable to those which apply between the parent company 
state and operational subsidiary state.26 Further notable elements of tax systems that have 
proven suitable to IHCs include: not imposing controlled foreign company rules on foreign 
                                            
23 Gutuza (note 14) at 193 & 203. 
24 s31(5)(a) of the Income Tax Act. 
25 Weyzig (note 21) 13-4 & 28; Alfons J. Weichenrieder & Jack Mintz What Determines the Use of 
Holding Companies and Ownership Chains (Working Paper, 15 March 2006) 29 & 42. 
26 Weichenrieder & Mintz 2006 (note 24) 23; Francis Weyzig Taxation & Development: Effects of Dutch 
Tax Policy on Taxation of Multinationals in Developing Countries (Phd Thesis, Radboud University 
Nijmegen, 13 November 2013) 91-2. 
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subsidiaries; a low rate of tax on dividends received; the absence of exchange controls; and a 
tax credit system for unilateral relief from double taxation.27 
 
2.2.4 The Netherlands has proven itself to be a popular jurisdiction for the placement of 
intermediary holding companies and other special purpose entities of MNEs.28 According to 
Desai et al, in 2003 it held the most US conduit companies at 652 or 21per cent of the total 
ultimately owned by US corporations.29 More recently, Weichenrieder recorded it hosting a 
significant amount of German conduit activity acting as a host in 660 instances.30 The basis 
for this success is that the Dutch taxation system is designed to facilitate the competitiveness 
of local MNE, presenting an opportunity for non-Dutch MNEs to plant an IHC there to exploit 
the benefits.31 The Netherlands also benefits from the notable capital mobility advantages that 
come with European Union directives such as the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the Interest 
and Royalty Directive.32 These directives have the effect of removing the tax cost of cross 
border intra-group dividends, interest, and royalty flows between EU member states by 
restricting the use of withholding taxes by source states.33 Their present importance being that 
they remove the tax cost of inbound investments and licencing, into the Netherlands from EU 
countries.  
 
                                            
27 Honiball & Olivier (note 19) 697; Thabo Legwaila ‘Characteristics of an Ideal Holding Company 
Location’ (2012) 45 De Jure 22 at 34. 
28 Weyzig Taxation and Development (note 25) 97. 
29 Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley & James R. Hines Jr. ‘Chains of Ownership, Regional Tax Competition, 
and Foreign Direct Investment’ W9224 NBER Working Paper 1 at 22. 
30 Weichenrieder & Mintz 11. 
31 Alex Berkhout & Marc Derks ‘Dutch Holding-, Finance-, and Royalty Companies, 2016’ at 4, 
accessed on 17 July 2016, available at https://www.horlingsnexia.nl/_WORDPRESS/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/Dutch-Holding-Finance-Royalty-companies.pdf. 
32 European Commission Directive 2003/123/EC of 22 December 2003; European Commission 
Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003. 
33 Weyzig (note 21)6-7; Thabo Legwaila ‘Tax Impediments to Holding Company Structures in Belgium, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom: Caution for South Africa’ (2011) 128 SALJ 533 at 534. 
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2.2.5 Despite having a relatively high rate of corporate tax, at 25per cent on profits beyond €200 
000, the Netherlands has several domestic tax provisions which are favourable to IHCs.34 The 
most notable is the Dutch participation exemption that allows for a 100per cent exemption 
from taxation on dividends, currency gains, and capital gains on shares. Provided the IHC 
holds at least 5per cent and certain substance requirements are met.35 Dividends withholding 
tax is payable on outbound payments, but may be nullified by the participation exemption or 
the Netherlands’ implementation of the EU Parent-Subsidiary Directive.36 The Netherlands 
does not charge withholding taxes on outbound royalty and interest payments even to non-
EU countries.37 The now defunct Group Financing Activities regime previously provided for 
a 6-10per cent effective tax rate on the balance of interest received less interest paid on loans 
from foreign affiliates.38 Lastly, the Netherlands both uses tax credits and allows deduction 
of foreign tax as a trade cost for unilateral relief of double taxation, which provides even 
further relief to MNEs subject taxation abroad.39 
 
2.2.6 Other relevant legal features outside of the main taxation legislation include: Dutch Co-
operative Associations which are commercial legal entities that, when inserted into an 
ownership chain, can provide a means to distribute profit to foreign, non-EU parent companies 
without paying a dividend withholding tax. This is because distributions by these entities 
under Dutch law do not qualify as dividends, unless there is evidence of abuse.40 The Dutch 
Belsatingdiens has a practice of providing advanced tax rulings and advanced pricing 
agreements. 41 Both provide certainty for MNEs wishing to set up structures, on matters such 
as whether the participation exemption applies. Some of the advanced tax rulings and 
                                            
34 Marnix Schellekens ‘Netherlands - Corporate Taxation’ (January 2017) Country Surveys IBFD para 
1.6.1, accessed on 24 February 2017, available at https://online-ibfd-
org.ezproxy.uct.ac.za/document/gtha_nl_chaphead. 
35 Art 13 Dutch Corporate Income Tax Law of 1969; Schellekens (note 34) para 2.2. 
36 Schellekens (note 34) para 1.6.2; Art 4 of the Dutch Withholding Tax Law of 1965. 
37 Schellekens (note 34) para 1.6.2. 
38 Weyzig Taxation and Development (note 25) 75; although as Weyzig notes there has been a 
proposal to implement a similar system on the table since 2011. 
39 Schellekens (note 34) para 6.1.4 
40 Weyzig (note 21) 4; although this treatment may change given the proposals by the Dutch Ministry 
of Finance in 2016 to apply the same treatment for dividends issued by Co-operatives and companies, 
see further Letter to the Lower House by Deputy Minister of Finance dated 20 September 2016. 
41 Dutch Secretary of Finance Decree DGB 2014/3099 of 12 July 2014. 
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advanced pricing agreements have been very favourable to MNEs, applying very low 
withholding tax rates or special treatment with tax advantages.42 A final, critical aspect is the 
wide net of tax treaties negotiated by the Dutch authorities, which provide low rates of 
withholding taxes for distributions from source states.43 For example the Dutch–South Africa 
Protocol to the DTA provides for a minimum of 5per cent and maximum of 10per cent 
withholding tax on dividends for the source state.44 All these factors combine to allow MNEs 
a secure framework where the flow of equity, debt finance, and intellectual property licences 
can be conducted with a minimal tax cost.  
 
2.2.7 There are several similarities between the Dutch tax system and s9I regime, meaning they can 
both be categorised as LISs aimed at attracting IHC activity. Both regimes provide potential 
withholding tax savings for dividends, interest, and royalty payments to parent companies.45 
The ability to avoid withholding taxes is a critical element necessary for a good IHC LIS and 
s9I displays best practice by incorporating such measures.46 As s9I cos are resident in South 
Africa they have access to its DTA network – an advantage which has been instrumental in 
the success of the Dutch system.47 South African and Dutch resident companies both have 
access to tax credits and deductions for foreign taxes paid.48 Both systems facilitate the loan 
financing of subsidiaries and licencing of intellectual property to them. S9I does so by not 
applying arm’s length requirements for licencing and debt finance to subsidiaries and 
exempting these payments from withholding taxes.49 While the Dutch system, being 
embedded in the EU allows for the routing of these investments through jurisdictions with 
                                            
42 Weyzig (note 21) 7 – 8; see also EU Commission Decision of 21 October 2015 On State Aid 
SA.38374 (2014/C ex 2014/NN) implemented by the Netherlands to Starbucks, where it was found 
that an advanced pricing agreement was tantamount to state aid because of the extent of beneficial 
treatment. 
43 Weyzig (note 21) 4; the validity of this proposition for South Africa is tested below in Part II para 3.5.  
44 GN 32 GG 31795 of 23 January 2009 at Art II; some of the Netherlands’ treaties reduce the 
withholding tax rate to 0per cent as is the case with Mongolia see further Weyzig (note 21) 4.  
45 In South Africa see s49D, s50D(1)(a)(i)(cc), s64E(1) of the Income Tax Act. 
46 Weyzig (note 21) 13-4 & 28, Weichenrieder & Mintz 2006 (note 24) 29 & 42 and Thabo Legwaila 
‘The Tax Treatment of Holding Companies in Mauritius: Lessons for South Africa’ (2011) SA Merc LJ 
1 at 14-5  
47 s9I (1)(a) of the Income Tax Act. 
48 ss6quin & 6quat of the Income Tax Act. 
49 s35(5), s49D, s50D(1)(a)(i)(cc), s64E(1)  of the Income Tax Act. 
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favourable interpretations of the arm’s length principle, tax efficiently by utilising EU 
directives.50  Both systems also do not impose a capital gains tax on the proceeds from 
disposal of shares in qualifying subsidiaries.51 Accordingly, both systems are ex facie well 
suited to facilitating IHC activity that is conduit in nature and display tax policy design 
features that follow best practice.  
 
2.2.8 The Netherlands has seen a vast amount of IHC activity and is probably the world’s most 
active conduit jurisdiction, but what benefit has it reaped for its troubles?52 Intuitively, IHCs 
acting as conduits would not have a major physical footprint, as they do not require large 
numbers of staff to perform their functions or conduct complex business operations. In the 
Netherlands IHC’s administrative functions, such as the incorporation and financing of 
subsidiaries, have generally been performed by either mailbox companies with minimal staff 
or have been outsourced to trust offices.53 Weyzig notes that “trust services and related 
financial and legal services generate approximately 3000 jobs and nearly €500 million in 
revenue for the Netherlands.54 However, this is small compared to other types of headquarter 
activities.55  
 
2.2.9 Weichenrieder and Mintz conducted a review of the nature of German outbound investment 
through conduit IHCs and found the Netherlands to have high balance sheet totals, €54.7 
billion or 9per cent of the German total in 2001, but with little to no fixed investment or job 
creation accounting for approximately 3per cent of either for German enterprises abroad.56 
This trend has held true going forward, as in 2011 the Netherlands hosted 1319 (4.9per cent 
of global total) German subsidiaries, but only 97000 (1.9per cent) of German subsidiaries’ 
                                            
50 For example, Irish transfer pricing rules do not apply to passive activities Irish Tax Consolidation 
Act 1997 Part 35A. 
51 See para 64B of the Eighth Schedule of the Income Tax Act; Schellekens (note 34) para 2.2. 
52 Weyzig Taxation and Development (note 25) 90, the Netherlands channelled about €1600 billion 
worth of foreign directed investment in 2009. 
53 Weyzig Taxation and Development (note 25) 73. 
54 Ibid at 83. 
55 Ibid at 83. 
56 Weichenrieder & Mintz 2006 (note 24) 14 & 4. 
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employees.57 In 2014 the position had not changed with 1355 (4.9per cent) German 
Subsidiaries in the Netherlands, employing 105400 (1.9per cent) people.58 Two countries 
which provide useful comparators are Switzerland and the Czech Republic as they are a tax 
haven and operational centre, respectively. In 2014 Switzerland held 1081 (3.9per cent) 
German subsidiaries, employing 104900 people (1.9per cent).59 While the Czech Republic 
hosted 706 (2.6per cent) German subsidiaries, employing 238200 (4.5per cent) people.60 This 
demonstrates that the Netherlands hosts a relatively high number of subsidiaries, which 
employ comparatively few employees. Therefore, as IHCs exhibit little propensity for fixed 
investment or employment in the Netherlands it becomes important to determine what is 
becoming of the capital they administer. 
 
2.2.10 Weyzig using 2007 data from the De Nederlandsche Bank’s statistics on IHCs, provided an 
asset holding and financial flow typology for Dutch IHCs.61 Weyzig also notes that Dutch 
IHCs conduct little real business activity within the Netherlands and that the balance sheet 
totals of the 468 IHCs with foreign subsidiaries were mainly dedicated to holding chain and 
group finance activities such as debt issuance and equity financing.62 Approximately 75per 
cent (€1050 billion) of the balance sheet totals of Dutch IHCs were dedicated to these 
activities, with holding chains making up the largest portion at €700 billion and intra-group 
lending coming in second at €250 billion.63 This trend has also remained in place and in 2014 
of a total asset base of €3 814 billion, €2 319 billion (60per cent) was dedicated to equity 
holdings abroad and €505 billion (13per cent) was loaned to affiliate companies abroad.64  In 
comparison to: local investments in real estate at €10 billion; Dutch equity holdings at €24 
                                            
57 Deutsche Bundesbank ‘Statistics on the Structure and Activity of Foreign Affiliates of German 
Investors 2014’ (2014) At 4 & 7. 
58 Deutsche Bundesbank ‘Statistics on the Structure and Activity of Foreign Affiliates of German 
Investors 2016’ (2016) at 4 & 7. 
59 Ibid at 5& 8. 
60 Ibid at 4 & 7. 
61 See generally Weyzig (note 21). 
62 Weyzig (note 21) 19.  
63 Ibid at 16. 
64 De Nederlandshce Bank ‘Table 15.1 Balance of Payments of Special Financial Institutions’ (26 
September 2016), accessed on 24 February 2017, available at 
https://www.dnb.nl/en/binaries/t15.1ey_tcm47-330620.xls?2017031122. 
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billion; and loans to Dutch affiliates at €4 billion.65 This is a strong indication that Dutch IHCs 
are largely concerned with cross border activities related to the financing of operating 
subsidiaries, rather than directly investing into the Dutch economy.  
 
2.2.11 Therefore, while there are large volumes of financial flows going through the Netherlands, 
there has been little direct investment by MNEs. Meaning the direct beneficiaries of this 
conduit investment would be the Dutch financial services industry that advises on and 
facilitates transactions or administers subsidiary investments.66 However, it is important to 
remember that attracting FDI was not the main factor at play in the design of the Dutch tax 
system, rather it was facilitating a competitive advantage for Dutch MNEs. An important 
difference to note when assessing the success of the Dutch system, as opposed to the s9I 
regime. So, the impact of the above is not necessarily negative for the Netherlands, because 
the routing of foreign direct investment through it brings about an increase in balance of 
payments and gross national product, which can provide positive indications for future direct 
investment. In addition to providing the competitive advantage intended for Dutch MNEs.  
 
2.2.12 Considering the nature of the functions of IHCs acting as conduits and the proven experience 
of the Netherlands, it is possible to infer the most likely externalities the s9I regime will 
produce. This is particularly so given the similarities between the two systems as discussed 
above. As the Dutch experience above shows, the IHC activity to be expected will likely be 
in the form of mailbox or small scale companies making use of financial/legal services. This 
would be beneficial to South Africa’s world class and large financial services industry, but it 
will not go far towards creating large numbers of job opportunities or result in the diffusion 
of business know-how which may stimulate South African enterprises.67  
 
2.2.13 With the expanded rate of unemployment at 36.3per cent at the end of the third quarter of 
2016 and a Gini coefficient for total household income at 0.66, a boost to an established 
financial services sector is not what South Africa needs the most to meet its developmental 
                                            
65 Ibid. 
66 Weyzig Taxation and Development (note 25) 83. 
67 Schwab (note 3) 326, the World Economic Forum rates South Africa’s financial services meeting 
business needs at 6.2/7 and its financial market development at 11th out of 138 countries. 
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goals and constitutional, socio-economic obligations.68 South Africa needs to incentivise FDI 
which produces concrete grass roots benefit; with actual businesses setting up active 
enterprises providing much needed fixed investment, labour absorption, and the diffusion of 
technological know-how or business skills.69 Importantly, this does not necessarily translate 
into actual operating companies, because a regional headquarters or financial management 
centre could provide indirect stimulus in this direction.  
 
2.2.14 Not only will conduit IHC activity not provide the positive externalities which South Africa 
needs the most, but it may have severely negative consequences for the South African state, 
local MNEs and the region at large. The South African state is a priori foregoing potential 
revenue from these international transactions, as this is the basis for the attractiveness of the 
regime. The lack of the necessary return for South Africa, as shown above, makes this loss of 
revenue difficult to justify. Moreover, research has repeatedly shown that the implementation 
of tax incentives in the absence of market fundamentals will encourage little new 
investment.70 Therefore, there is a likelihood that s9I will be victim to a deadweight or a 
redundancy cost, where investments which would have been routed through South Africa in 
any case are done so without contributing to South Africa’s tax base, through s9I.   
 
2.2.15 The Dutch tax system was designed to facilitate a competitive advantage for Dutch MNEs, 
hence the beneficial rules applying to resident parent companies in the holding chains. 
However, South Africa has treated the s9I as a possible route for base erosion leading to 
legislative restrictions intended to curb this. These include limiting the benefits available to 
transactions with foreign affiliate companies and inserting s9H which requires the payment 
of an ‘entrance tax’ to qualify for the regime. Section 9I companies not being subject to the 
arm’s length principle, CFC rules, tax on interest, or dividends received therefore distorts 
competition in favour of large MNEs capable of exploiting the cross-border based benefits 
                                            
68  Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit ‘National Income Dynamics Study: Wave 
4 Overview’ (2016) at 15; Statistics South Africa ‘Quarterly Labour Force Survey, Quarter 3: 2016’ 
(2016) at 20.  
69 Oguttu (note 14) at 64; Katz Commission of Inquiry ‘Fifth Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry 
into certain aspects of the tax structure of South Africa’ (1997) at para 3.1.2.7 (Katz Commission). 
70 Howell H. Zee, Janet G. Stotsky & Eduardo Ley ‘Tax Incentives for Business Investment: A Primer 
for Policy Makers in Developing Countries’ (2002) 30 World Development 1497 at 1508-9; Weyzig 
Taxation and Development (note 25) (note 25) 82. 
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available under s9I.71 Leaving local MNEs to bear a tax and administrative burden where 
foreign owned MNEs would not.72 A further disadvantage to South Africans is that resident 
shareholders may have the income of a CFC controlled by a s9I co  attributed to them, where 
they collectively own more than 50per cent of the s9I co.73  
 
2.2.16 The above is not consonant with the fundamental principles of equity and neutrality. 
Neutrality requires that taxation not impose a cost or saving which would distort the ordinary 
behaviour of tax payers, as this would distort an assumedly efficient market.74 Equity’s 
relevance for present purposes is requiring that tax payers in similar positions are taxed 
similarly.75 These principles are cornerstones of good taxation policy and breaching them in 
this context manifests in direct negative consequences for South African MNEs.76 This 
violation of principle is actually harmful to the developmental agenda of South Africa as it 
has the effect of depressing local enterprises which could be providing revenue and 
employment. 
 
2.2.17 A further disadvantage for South Africa in hosting an IHC LIS is the regional damage to be 
wrought by providing an efficient location for treaty shopping.77 A regime which encouraged 
or enabled treaty shopping would constitute a harmful preferential tax regime according to 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (‘OECD’).78 If so, this would 
be contrary to South Africa’s regional obligation to refrain from harmful tax competition 
                                            
71 Gutuza (note 14) at 193-7 & 201; Weyzig Taxation & Development 71. 
72 Gutuza (note 14) at 197. 
73 s9D(2) ITA; Oguttu (note 14) 76; AP de Koker & RC Williams Silke  on South African Income Tax 
ed 58 (2016) para 13.45. 
74 Tracy Gutuza An analysis of the methods used in the South African domestic legislation and in 
double taxation treaties entered into by South Africa for the elimination of international double taxation 
(Phd Thesis, University of Cape Town, 2013) 6. 
75 Ibid 4-5 
76 Ibid Phd 4 
77 Weichenrieder & Mintz 2006 (note 24) 23. 
78 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging 
Global Issue (1998) 32. 
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under the SADC Memorandum of Understanding on Taxation and Related Matters.79 An 
example of treaty shopping in action is the allegedly successful avoidance of corporate tax by 
South African Breweries Pty (‘SAB’). SABMiller International BV (‘SABMiller’), the Dutch 
resident parent company of SAB, is reported to have bought the trademarks of various beers 
and registered them in the Netherlands.80 SAB then exploited the low rates of royalty 
withholding tax applicable under the Dutch-South Africa DTA to make large royalty 
payments to SABMiller, reducing its gross income.81 This is estimated to have resulted in an 
estimated loss to the South African fiscus of approximately R77 million in 2012.82  
 
2.2.18 Similar results could be obtained if a s9I cowas used to exploit the benefits of a South African 
treaty which provides for beneficial withholding tax rates to the country of residence. S9I also 
has the added benefit that no withholding tax is charged when repatriating beyond South 
Africa. If MNEs can avoid significant taxes in an emerging economy such as South Africa by 
making use of treaty shopping, then the chances of less sophisticated countries in the region 
not falling victim to this is slim at best. The enactment of a LIS which constitutes a harmful 
preferential taxation regime presents an element of policy inconsistency, as it runs contrary 
to efforts at regional integration, such as the Common Monetary Area and Southern African 
Customs Union.  
 
2.2.19 In sum, the s9I regime is a LIS that provides a means for MNEs to establish a conduit IHC in 
South Africa, offering similar benefits as the Dutch tax system. This similarity has been used 
to show that the results which have manifested in the Dutch context are likely to occur in 
South Africa, as the same business functions are incentivised. Unfortunately, these results are 
not what South Africa needs at this stage in its development. Importantly South Africa is 
willingly depriving itself of tax revenue, a sacrifice which has not been sufficiently justified 
through anticipated positive returns. Further, s9I is providing a competitive advantage to 
foreign owned MNEs that is likely to distort competition in favour of these firms and against 
                                            
79 Oguttu (note 14) at 67-8; Tracy Gutuza ‘Economic development and the role of tax in Southern 
Africa: the South African headquarter company structure’ in Yariv Brauner and Miranda Stewart (eds) 
Tax, Law and Development (2013) 77. 
80 Martin Hearson & Richard Brooks ‘Calling Time: Why SABMiller should stop dodging taxes in Africa’  
(2010) 23. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
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South African MNEs attempting to penetrate the same market, under a greater tax burden. 
The negative outcomes which are to be produced by the s9I regime also include a regional 
aspect. The likelihood that South Africa would be used as a destination for treaty shopping is 
greatly increased by the nature of the s9I regime. Thus, encouraging a practice which is 
increasingly being shown to unjustifiably detract from developing countries’ revenue 
generation.83 This leaves the s9I in a position where, from a tax policy perspective, it is very 
difficult to justify its continued existence in the statute books. 
 
2.3 Singapore’s Regional Headquarter Company Incentive Schemes 
 
2.3.1 With the numerous shortcomings of a pure IHC regime in South Africa it is useful to explore 
the form of holding company which is s9I’s namesake: headquarter companies. This section 
seeks to determine whether headquarter companies are a more appropriate fit to South 
Africa’s tax and overall government policy. This will be so if headquarter companies present 
a viable form of MNE activity to incentivise and produce the developmental results necessary 
for the country. Additionally, the comparative exercise with Singapore’s efforts to incentivise 
regional headquarter companies will elucidate the virtues of a LIS geared towards attracting 
these MNE activities.  
 
2.3.2 A headquarter company is defined by Honiball and Olivier as an intermediary company which 
in the main provides “any or all of the services which are auxiliary to the multinational group’s 
main business or operational activities on a centralised basis.”84 Avenell adopts a definition 
which describes the regional variant as providing coordination, control and business planning 
functions for geographic locations distant from the parent company.85 Typical headquarter 
activities would include strategic management, accounting, treasury, legal services, 
marketing, and innovation.86 The precise mix of functions; depth of involvement in 
                                            
83 See generally Hearson & Brooks (note 79). 
84 Honiball & Olivier (note 19) 692. 
85 Avenell (note 12) 1. 
86 Honiball & Olivier (note 19) 692; Oguttu (note 14) at 66. 
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operational affiliates; and role in the group’s structure embodied in a particular headquarter 
is usually tailored to the strategy of the specific enterprise.87 
 
2.3.3 Regardless of the variations in a particular headquarter company, they are by their nature 
active companies, often with substantial staff complements.88 This is an important distinction 
for present purposes, to the holding and remittance functions of IHCs. Therefore, incentivising 
such companies is to target the positive externalities associated with active enterprises.89 For 
example, throughout the early 1990s the Singapore’s Economic Development Board 
estimated that annual investment commitments by regional headquarter companies (‘RHQ’) 
ranged between S$250 million and S$350 million.90 This type of foreign direct investment 
would provide direct economic benefits to the people of South Africa and thereby contribute 
to its developmental ambitions. Meaning that incentivising regional headquarter activities 
would be more in tune with overall government policy, than pure holding activities.  
 
2.3.4 The economic boom during the early to mid-1990s in South East Asia saw many countries 
vying to be the jurisdiction from which multinational companies penetrated the region. The 
success stories became known as the ‘newly industrialised countries’ or ‘Asian Tigers’ and 
have been used as case study comparators for developing countries since. The RHQ 
increasingly became viewed as the best means to enter the region, as it reduced geographical 
distance to markets and other disincentives to foreign direct investment in unfamiliar terrain.91 
To exploit the trend towards RHQs several Asian jurisdictions put forward LISs intended to 
attract this form of investment. Many of these were taxation based, with states competing to 
ensure their jurisdiction was the most favourable. Avnell posits that this competition was 
                                            
87 Martin Perry, Henry Yeung & Jessie Poon Regional Office Mobility: the Case of Corporate Control 
in Singapore and Hong Kong 29 Geoforum 237 at 251. 
88 Perry, Yeung & Poon (note 86) at 239, citing the EDB stated that Sony’s RHQ in 1996 employed 
300 staff providing financial management, sales, marketing and logistical support to regional affiliates; 
see further Oguttu (note 14) at 67. 
89 Avenell (note 12) 8. 
90 Perry, Yeung & Poon (note 86) at 239. 
91 Avnell at 2; Albena J. Gradeva Inward FDI determinants: The Case of the Netherlands (Msc Thesis, 
Erasmus School of Economics) 29. 
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based on the assumption that RHQs’ service based functions were locationally flexible.92 
Unlike operational functions which are tied to the factors of production such as labour or raw 
materials. Many East and South East Asian jurisdictions continue to rely on the policy of 
incentivising RHQs today, to attract MNE’s ‘top brass’ and entice key, value adding MNE 
functions.93 The RHQ incentivisation methodology adopted by the Asian Tigers could be 
replicated by South Africa as a more effective facet of its developmental agenda than the 
present s9I. 
 
2.3.5 Authors on the theme of location choice for RHQs recognise that tax is but a factor in the 
matrix of influences upon the decision on where to locate a RHQ.94  Perry, Yeung and Poon 
are among several authors who have placed little store in the efficacy of tax incentives in 
attracting RHQs.95 However, even they find that the significant uptake of tax incentives points 
towards them being a factor in the decision.96 Furthermore, Yin & Walsh note that authors on 
the location decisions of US corporations have identified both personal and commercial 
reasons for the location of RHQs.97 The commercial factors or market conditions are 
important, because RHQs are active companies which need an inviting, stable and sound 
commercial climate. RHQs also require skilled staff, many of whom relocate to the RHQ 
jurisdiction leading to the importance of personal factors such as quality of life and cost of 
living.98 The mix of factors available in a particular country would be considered by an 
enterprise seeking to enter a region in light of its commercial strategy and needs, towards 
making a decision on which jurisdiction is the most suitable.99 
 
                                            
92 Avnell at 2, Perry, Yeung & Poon (note 86) at 250-1 discusses the finding that RHQs are relatively 
immobile entities once established, with MNEs preferring to set up new RHQs than relocate existing 
offices.  
93 Grant Thornton ‘Locating in South East Asia: Weighing up the headquarter options’ (2015) at 1. 
94 Avenell (note 12) 11; Perry, Yeung & Poon (note 86) at 247 – 50. 
95 Perry, Yeung & Poon (note 86) 248; Avenell (note 12) 12; Zee, Stotsky & Ley (Note 69) at 1508-9. 
96 Perry, Yeung & Poon (note 86) 248 & 253; Avenell (note 12) 12. 
97 Myat Su Yin & John Walsh ‘Analysing the Factors Contributing to the Establishment of Thailand as 
a Hub for Regional Operating Headquarters’ 2 Journal for Economics and Behavioural Studies 275 at 
279. 
98 Yin & Walsh (note 96) at 279. 
99 K.C. Ho ‘Competing to be Regional Centres: A Multi-agency, Multi-locational Perspective’ 37 Urban 
Studies 2337 at 2340. 
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2.3.6 South Africa displays characteristics which are desirable in a RHQ location such as good 
telecommunications infrastructure, entrenched rule of law, English proficiency, and overall 
dominance in the Southern African region.100 However, certain market imperfections may be 
viewed as obstacles, including low labour productivity, policy uncertainty despite the 
dominance of the ANC over the political system, and a concentrated demand which comes 
with a highly unequal society. An efficient and favourable tax has acted as a swing factor in 
the location decisions of RHQs and the presence of an RHQ LIS could be determinative where 
country’s rank similarly.101 Also, a fine-tuned approach to incentivisation could produce 
favourable results by compensating for unfavourable factors.102   
 
2.3.7 The average annual per capita GDP growth of above 6per cent experienced by South East 
Asia between 1965 and 1995 set the stage for the surge in RHQs looking to exploit this market 
during the 1990s.103 Southern Africa is not in a comparable period of rapid growth, yet it 
remains a viable destination for foreign direct investment and therefore for the use of RHQs. 
Southern Africa’s growth drivers have traditionally centred around the established extractive 
industries. This continues to be the case, as evidenced by the strong performances of the 
Mozambican and Angolan economies in the recent past, mainly on the back of resource 
industries.104 However, the dominance of the service sector in South Africa’s GDP has led to 
this being the leading contributor to regional GDP at 55per cent.105 With different growth 
drivers in the various Southern African countries, there is a variety of opportunities for 
MNEs.106 Overall for the region, there has been good  recovery in foreign direct investment 
inflow levels in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. Regional FDI inflows peaked at $14 
                                            
100 Yin & Walsh (note 96) at 281 – 3; South Africa had a 55per cent share of the SADC GDP in 2014, 
see South African Institute of International Affairs ‘Regional Business Barriers: Unlocking Economic 
Potential in Southern Africa’ (2014) at 17 (Regional Business Barriers). 
101 Yin & Walsh (note 96) at 279; Perry, Yeung & Poon (note 86) at 249; Avenell (note 12) 23. 
102 Watanabe (note 12) at 88 & 116; Avenell (note 12) 15 
103 Monaheng Seleteng & Sephooko Motelle ‘Sources of Economic Growth in the Southern African 
Development Community: Its Likely Impact on Poverty and Employment’ (2015) at 2 (); Avenell (note 
12) 2-3; Singapore’s OHC regime interestingly was a response to the 1986 recession, see further 
Economic Committee ‘The Singapore Economy: New Directions’ (1986). 
104 Regional Barriers at 16; Seleteng & Motelle (note 102) at 4-5 & 9.  
105 Regional Barriers at 21. 
106 For a summary of the various growth drivers across the SADC region see Seleteng & Motelle (note 
102) 4-16. 
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billion in 2008, dropped to a low of $3.5 billion in 2010 and have climbed to previous levels 
with a figure of $17.9 billion in 2015.107 This demonstrates the resilience of the appetite for 
investment into the region. This viable economic atmosphere could be useful to an MNE 
seeking to expand into Africa, giving cause to establish an RHQ. Given Southern Africa’s 
potential and continued foreign direct investment inflow, there are valuable lessons to be 
taken from the experiences of the Asian Tigers, which could provide the competitive edge in 
incentivising RHQs.  
 
2.3.8 Applying the best practices of successful Asian RHQ LISs, past and present, will help South 
Africa encourage companies to establish RHQs by compensating for its less appealing 
characteristics. Yin and Walsh report that a survey conducted in the 1990s showed that 30per 
cent of MNEs selected Singapore as their preferred RHQ jurisdiction; this was second only 
to Hong Kong which was preferred by 35per cent of MNEs.108 Between 1986 and 1996 
approximately 100 RHQs were awarded preferential tax treatment under agreements with the 
Singaporean government.109 The 1996/97 Far Eastern Economic Review survey of 6000 
executives in 11 countries placed Singapore first for regional headquarters, ahead of Hong 
Kong.110 The above demonstrates Singapore’s growing success in attracting RHQs to its 
shores during the 1990s; a clear indication of best practices. This success was despite having 
faced aspects which were not appealing to RHQs such as high office premises rents, and 
relatively scarce, expensive labour.111 It therefore presents a valuable comparator to South 
Africa which shares many of Singapore’s positive aspects, including a strong financial 
services sector and geographic positioning; while also embodying comparable challenges. 
 
                                            
107 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ‘World Investment Report 2016: Annex 
Table 1 FDI inflows’ (2016). 
108 Hong Kong was less suitable for present purposes, because it’s success as a RHQ location is 
based on its application of source based taxation at the time, while Singapore implemented a tax 
based incentive programme akin to s9I; see further Katz Commission par 3.1.4.1 cited in Oguttu (note 
14) 72. 
109 Perry, Yeung & Poon (note 86) 248 
110 K.C. Ho ‘Competing to be Regional Centres: a Multi-agency, Multi-locational Perspective’ 2337 at 
2343. 
111 Perry, Yeung & Poon (note 86) 248 
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2.3.9 Singapore in the 1990s, managed to present an attractive destination for RHQs. From a tax 
perspective, its corporate tax system already presented features which were favourable to 
holding activities. These included not imposing a withholding tax on dividends or a capital 
gains tax.112 It had a good network of DTAs in place, providing favourable rates for 
withholding in source states.113 These factors, in combination with RHQ incentives, allowed 
for hybrids of RHQs and IHCs providing structural flexibility, valuable to prospective RHQs. 
More generally, Singapore’s ruling People’s Action Party had early on adopted the stance of 
a developmental state and was unwaveringly true to its role in Singapore’s development.114 
This led to a perception of political stability and openness to business which was appreciated 
by RHQs.115 Singapore is also well positioned in the region geographically, being at the centre 
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (‘ASEAN’) region.116 The developmental state 
policies of the People’s Action Party helped produce a skilled labour force and good 
infrastructure, including telecommunications and port facilities.117 These factors provided the 
background for the success of Singapore’s RHQ LIS efforts, which had the effect of  
incentivising RHQ activities and compensating for Singapore’s negative aspects.118 
 
2.3.10 Singapore implemented the first manifestation of its RHQ LIS in 1986 through the 
Operational Headquarter Company (‘OHC’) scheme.119 The OHC will be used to determine 
transferable RHQ incentivisation fundamentals, because at that time Singapore was more 
proximate to South Africa’s present stage of development. The OHC was replaced by several 
variations, most recently the Approved Headquarter Company Award (‘AHCA’), which was 
                                            
112 Dean A Yoost & John E Fisher ‘Choosing Regional HQs in Asia’ (1996) 7 International Tax Review 
35 at 36 (Yoost & Fisher).  
113 Mukul G. Asher ‘Tax Reform in Singapore’ (1999) 91 Asia Research Centre Working Paper 1 at 4. 
114 Linda Low ‘The Singapore Developmental State in the New Economy and Polity’ (2001) 14 The 
Pacific Review 411 at 412. 
115 Perry, Yeung & Poon (note 86) at 248. 
116 Ibid at 244, 248-9. 
117 Ibid at 248. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Avenell (note 12) 14; s43E of the Singapore Income Tax Act 39 of 1947 read with Income Tax 
(Concessionary Rate of Tax for Approved Headquarters Company) Regulations 1988, GN No. S 
43/1988. 
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itself repealed in 2015.120 This later LIS will be used to investigate what lessons were learnt 
by Singapore and what adaptations were required for RHQ incentivisation in the 21st century.  
 
2.3.11 The Singapore Income Tax Act 39 of 1947 and relevant regulations empowered Singapore’s 
Economic Development Board (‘EDB’) to negotiate and award OHC status to qualifying 
MNEs with a resident entity in Singapore.121 The EDB targeted enterprises which were front 
runners in their sector for OHC status and acted as a one-stop shop for RHQs, negotiating the 
prerequisites and facilitating their establishment.122 The requirements for OHC status 
enforced by EDB included commitments to have an agreed level of paid-up equity capital in 
the OHC, a local spend at a minimum level and a number of expatriate, skilled employees in 
Singapore.123 The benefits available under the OHC included a concessionary tax rate of 10per 
cent, rather than 27per cent applicable at the time, on income from the provision of specified 
services to foreign group companies; as well as royalties and interest received from regional 
affiliates.124 OHC companies also benefitted from an exemption on dividends paid out of 
income taxed at concessionary rates, allowing remittance to parent companies.125 The core of 
the scheme can be described as: requiring a predetermined level of local fixed investment and 
MNE activity, in return for tax concessions on the proceeds of intra-group services.  
 
2.3.12 There are a several clear distinctions between the OHC scheme and the s9I regime, which 
point to their divergent core purposes. First, s9I does not require any minimum level of 
investment in South Africa or any other country. Rather, it only stipulates the types of foreign 
investments to be held by the s9I co.126 Secondly, the OHC provides for a measure of 
administrative discretion, as the EDB is given the authority to negotiate the awarding of OHC 
status. There is no role for the administrative organs of state under s9I, aside from receiving 
the requisite form, determining qualification and accepting the election into s9I’s provisions. 
Thirdly, while the OHC scheme is mainly directed towards providing tax concessions for 
qualifying intra-group services, s9I allows these to be fully taxable in the hands of a qualifying 
                                            
120 Singapore 2015 Budget Annex A-6: Tax Changes. 
121 s43E of the Singapore Income Tax Act; Yoost & Fisher at 37; Avenell (note 12) 14. 
122 Avenell (note 12) 14 
123 Yoost & Fisher at 37. 
124 Yoost & Fisher at 37; Avenell (note 12) 14. 
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company. These differences are indicative of areas where s9I could be re-engineered to target 
RHQ activity, but also possible improvements to the regimes general efficacy and 
attractiveness.  
 
2.3.13 For South Africa to begin heading down the path towards incentivising RHQs the proceeds 
from the main activities of these companies should be given tax relief. The OHC does this by 
applying the concessionary tax rate of 10per cent to income generated from listed intra-group 
services. This concession, aside from indicating a willingness to host RHQs, has utility for an 
MNE by reducing the overall tax burden it faces.127 Replicating this aspect of the OHC is 
critical if s9I is to be geared towards attracting MNE’s RHQ activities.128 This sees to the 
incentivisation aspect, yet the local substance benefits would not be guaranteed. South Africa 
thus ought to consider mimicking local direct investment requirements such as those adopted 
in the OHC, to ensure direct returns for the country.  
 
2.3.14 The AHCA regime followed a similar pattern to the OHC, requiring local direct investment 
in exchange for tax concessions. The EDB also administered this scheme and continued with 
its policy of targeting leading firms in the relevant sector.129 The EDB offered a fast-tracked 
consideration of applications for the AHCA, allowing for a two week turn around.130 Under 
the AHCA potential qualifiers were required to be the regional hub for senior management, 
perform a substantial level of headquarter functions, and for the staff performing these 
functions to be based in Singapore.131 This status would be conferred for a renewable five 
year periods.132 Throughout the time a 15per cent concessionary rate of income tax was 
applied to a wide range of income, including trading income and service fees.133 AHCA 
                                            
127 Avenell (note 12) 14-5; Watanabe (note 12) at 117.  
128 The same point was made by Oguttu (note 14) at 85-7. 
129 Edmund Leow & Allen Tan ‘Singapore: Regional Tax Minimisation’ May/June 2007 Asia-Pacific 
Tax Bulletin 190 at 191(); Shanker Iyer (note 128) ‘International Tax Planning Under Singapore 
Domestic Law and Treaties’ January/February 2004 Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin 92 at 97 (Iyer (note 
128)).  
130 Leow & Tan (note 128) at 191. 
131 Ibid at 191; Iyer (note 128) at 97. 
132 Leow & Tan (note 128) at 191. 
133 Leow & Tan (note 128) at 191; reg 2, read with reg 4 Income Tax (Concessionary Rate of Tax for 
Approved Headquarters Company) (Amendment) Regulations 2013, 15. G. N. No. S 516/2013 
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companies would also benefit from the absence of a tax on dividends received and relief for 
withholding tax on dividends paid to parent companies.134 Should the company fail to comply 
during the period, there was the possibility of a clawback of tax saved.135 However, if the 
period of incentivisation ended, the RHQ was offered a tax free exit out of Singapore.136 To 
be awarded AHCA status a company must commit to satisfying relatively stringent criteria 
for local investment and human capital absorption. Potential awardee companies must commit 
to: having a paid-up equity capital of S$200 000 by the end of year one, and S$500 000 by 
the end of year three; to incurring at least a S$2 million spend in Singapore by the end of year 
three; to perform at least three qualifying intra group headquarter services; employ 75per cent 
skilled workers; and pay an average remuneration of S$100 000 by the end of year three.137 
A variation aimed at international headquarter companies was also introduced, with more 
stringent local content requirements, but with the potential for a tax rate of 0per cent for 20 
years.138 
 
2.3.15 The AHCA maintained the same core foundation as the OHC, but the incentive scheme was 
fine-tuned over the years to target the benefits Singapore required the most. The AHCA was 
even more stringent on the local investment requirements, incorporating both increased 
monetary and new labour absorption requirements. With a relatively skilled population 
Singapore could provide the skills required by RHQs locally. It therefore chose to require 
AHCA companies to absorb local labour, rather than incentivise the importation of expatriate 
labour, as has been the case in Thailand and other developing jurisdictions.139 The 
requirements for AHCA companies to employ 75per cent skilled workers and pay an average 
of S$100 000 are also indicative of the type of labour absorption aimed for by Singapore. The 
modification of the scheme to allow for concessionary rates on wider range of income 
provided more flexibility to potential RHQs. However, this was compensated for by bringing 
                                            
134 Yin & Walsh (note 96) at 227. 
135 Leow & Tan (note 128) at 190. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Leow & Tan (note 128) at 191; Iyer (note 128) at 97. 
138 Leow & Tan (note 128) at 191-2, Iyer (note 128) at 97 
139 Yin & Walsh (note 96) at 278. 
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the concessionary rate closer to the corporate tax rate.140 AHCA status and the concomitant 
benefits were granted for renewable periods of five years which was important as it provided 
certainty of benefit for a set amount of time, even before entering negotiations with EDB.141 
This certainty was reinforced by the possibility of a tax-free exit out of Singapore after the 
expiry of the period.  
 
2.3.16 From the above, three major themes can be deduced which if implemented in s9I could be 
beneficial to South Africa’s incentivisation efforts. The AHCA’s fine-tuned targeting 
compared to the OHC is a lesson which could be adopted specifically to aid in South Africa’s 
competitiveness in attracting RHQs, and maximising the utility of hosting RHQs. Secondly, 
guaranteed access to the benefits of the scheme for a generally applicable, certain time period 
is a facet of Singapore’s RHQ LIS efforts which has evolved from the ad hoc agreement 
approach applicable under the OHC. Lastly, allowing administrative management and agility 
is a more general lesson on the competitiveness of LISs and is an element of the 
incentivisation scheme shared with the Netherlands. Overall, Singapore’s experiences show 
that South Africa should offer targeted, dependable tax concessions, but require the type of 
local direct investment which would further its developmental agenda. 
 
2.3.17 The utility of proper targeting of a LIS’s requirements and benefits, to achieve what would 
provide the most utility to a given country, has been exemplified in the evolution of the OHC 
into the AHCA. The returns guaranteed for Singapore through its efforts in enforcing 
investment requirements, have moved beyond capital investment and assured expenditure, to 
including set standards for labour absorption by RHQs. 142 This is evidence of fine-tuning for 
local circumstances, because Singapore’s relatively plentiful supply of skilled labour needed 
absorbing, and RHQs were a potential means to achieve this policy goal. This could 
analogously be applied to the South African context where sluggish growth and high 
unemployment could be alleviated through required levels of direct investment into South 
Africa, attracted through commercially useful tax concessions. With a skilled labour supply 
                                            
140 The rate at the time was 17per cent, see further Chris J. Finnerty et al ‘Tax Strategies for Investing 
and Structuring into Asia-Pacific – Use of Hong Kong and Singapore as Regional Holding Companies’ 
September/October 2011 Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin 332 at 335. 
141 cf s9I (3) of the Income Tax Act; initially 5 years, closer to repeal 3 years. 
142 Leow & Tan (note 128) at 191; Iyer (note 128) at 97. 
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that is often exported in what has been termed a ‘brain drain’, applying similar labour 
absorption requirements to those in Singapore could assist in abating the outflow of skilled 
employees. This is particularly so, because RHQs generally require skilled staff to perform 
the intra-group services. S9I, if modified to attract RHQs, could produce guaranteed, concrete 
benefits for South Africa should similar local investment and labour absorption prerequisites 
be introduced. 
 
2.3.18 Secondly, both the OHC and AHCA were driven by the organ of state implementing the 
schemes. Providing the EDB with authority over the scheme, provided two important benefits. 
It allowed the EDB to control the process, with the authority to decide which firms to pro-
actively target for RHQ status and thereby the industries to stimulate.143 Under the AHCA, 
this authority enabled the EDB to provide the fast-tracking system and the escalating benefits 
available under the Approved International Headquarter Company Award (‘AIHCA’).144 
Responsibility for the regime vesting in one institution also provides the opportunity for it to 
build a repository of specialised knowledge of the dynamics of incentivisation. Such as the 
types of companies applying and their levels of investment, which could be used to further 
refine the regime. Under s9I there is no role for either National Treasury or the South African 
Revenue Service (‘SARS’), aside from SARS’ normal returns processing and advanced tax 
ruling functions. Were the s9I regime to place full responsibility for its promotion, 
implementation and refinement in either entity it would provide a champion of the incentive 
which could engage in its promotion and build up information to aid in its fine-tuning.  
 
2.3.19 Providing certainty for potential RHQs, that it will benefit under a LIS for a certain period is 
of critical importance. This certainty allows for effective medium term planning, as these 
benefits become a constant variable. The importance guaranteed benefit is amplified where 
there are local investment requirements built into the LIS, because an MNE would not be 
willing to make significant investments it would not otherwise make, if it was not guaranteed 
a resultant benefit. The AHCA provided a level of certainty, because it provided the tax 
concessions for a period of five years, subject to compliance with requirements.145 
Additionally, it provided the peace of mind that came with a tax-free exit upon expiry of the 
                                            
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid. 
145 s9I (1); initially 5 years, closer to repeal 3 years. 
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period, enabling the efficient ending of a short-term investment.146 The lack of certainty 
endemic in the s9I regime is a major theme of Part II, and is explored fully there, particularly 
sub-part 3.3. Regardless, the patent implication is that South Africa needs to implement a 
measure of certainty beyond the, at best, single year of assessment currently provided for in 
s9I (1) read with s9I (3).  
 
2.3.20 In conclusion, regional headquarter company activities are highly suited to encouraging broad 
based benefit for the people of South Africa, as RHQs produce the externalities of operating 
enterprises such as direct and indirect employment, local direct investment in requirements 
such as office space and skills diffusion as local employees are exposed to RHQ practices. 
Therefore, incentivising such activities would be consistent with the broader government 
policy of encouraging enterprise development and labour absorption. South Africa provides 
a viable destination for RHQ MNE activity and it ought to capitalise on this potential. What 
led to Singapore’s success is the combination of positive structural factors brought about by 
the People’s Action Party’s concerted efforts to get Singapore’s market basics right and the 
compensatory effect of the RHQ LISs.147 South Africa is in a comparable position and with a 
proper emphasis on market fundamentals it could achieve the same results in incentivising 
the locating of RHQs within its borders. In embarking down the road of incentivising RHQs, 
South Africa would do well to adopt the tax concessions in exchange for required investment 
model implemented by Singapore. This model’s major benefit is that it guarantees a certain 
level of investment and activity within the borders of South Africa. This would be a positive 
step from the present position of s9I which provides tax concessions merely in the hope of 
attracting MNE investment into South Africa. To begin attracting RHQ activity s9I would 
have to be modified to incentivise the activities of RHQs, which are mainly the provision of 
services to regional affiliates. Options for optimising the efficacy of the s9I regime include 
placing responsibility for the running of the scheme squarely within a single institution and 
ensuring that MNEs are guaranteed returns under the regime for a predetermined period of 
time.  
 
2.4 Contemporary Regional Competition  
 
                                            
146 Leow & Tan (note 128) at 190. 
147 Zee, Stotsky & Ley (Note 69) at 1508; Watanabe (note 12) at 88 & 116; Avenell (note 12) 15. 
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2.4.1 South Africa has chosen to pursue IHC activity through s9I. Despite the position taken in this 
work that IHC activity is in fact harmful and contradicts broader government policy, it 
remains to determine how competitive, the policy design as evidenced by the provisions of 
the s9I regime, is in comparison to other African tax incentive options. It will also be of use 
to investigate whether contemporaries are attempting to incentivise RHQs or IHQs, to 
determine the level of competition in this area.  
 
2.4.2  The above exploration of both the Netherlands and Singapore has brought forward several 
general propositions on best practice design features for IHC and RHQ LISs respectively. The 
best practices regarding IHC LISs include: the ability to limit withholding taxes and provide 
access to treaty benefits, the extent and nature of tax concession provided on cross border 
passive investment and repatriation, the nature of unilateral double taxation relief and the 
certainty of accessing the benefits of the scheme. RHQ LIS best practices incorporate many 
of the same as for IHCs, in addition to: tax relief for intra-group services, a prerequisite level 
of local investment and targeted substance requirements. 
 
2.4.3 There are several jurisdictions in Southern African which have shown themselves as amenable 
to incentivising MNE activity.148 Mauritius’ Global Business Licencing regime is an 
established IHC LIS in a comparable developing, come middle income country and indeed is 
the main competition faced by s9I.149 Botswana in recent times has managed to position itself 
as an attractive destination for the setting up of regional headquarters, particularly in the 
mining sector.150 It will therefore provide a comparator which has fairly recently begun 
incentivising MNE activity, that is not a low tax jurisdiction and which has encouraged both 
holding and headquarter activities. 
 
Table 1: Comparison Between s9I, GBC 1 & IFSC   
 South Africa: s9I Regime Mauritius: Global Business 
Company 1 (GBC 1) 
Botswana: International 
Financial Service Centres 
(IFSC) 
                                            
148 See for example Nigeria and Kenya in Gutuza (note 14) at 204 in note 77. 
149 Gutuza (note 14) at 188. 
150 Seleteng & Motelle (note 102) 5.  
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Requirements • At least 10 per cent of 
equity shares & voting rights 
held by each shareholder, or 
group; 
• 80per cent costs 
attributable to shares in, debt of, 
or intellectual property licenced 
to qualifying foreign company; 
• 50per cent gross 
income attributable to passive 
investment in foreign qualifying 
company.151 
Resident GBC must be managed 
and controlled from Mauritius. 
Authorities consider factors 
including:152 
• Registered Office in 
Mauritius, where accounting 
records are kept; 
• 2 directors resident in 
Mauritius, who attend board 
meetings; 
• Mauritian principle 
bank account; 
• Financial statements 
audited in Mauritius; and 
• One of the following: 
▪ Office premises in 
Mauritius, 
▪ At least one full time 
administrative/technical 
employee; 
▪ Constitution of the 
company requires disputes 
arising from constitution to 
be settled by arbitration in 
Mauritius; 
▪ Holds assets of at least 
US$100 000, aside from 
cash or shares in GBC 
company, in Mauritius; 
▪ Listed on Mauritian 
stock exchange; 
▪ Reasonable annual 
expenditure in Mauritius. 153 
• Certificated by Botswana 
Investment and Trade 
Centre;154 
• Performance of specified 
financial service to non-
residents.155 
                                            
151 s9(2)(a)-(c) of the Income Tax Act. 
152 s71 (1) & (4)(b) Mauritius Financial Services Act 14 of 2007. 
153 Financial Services Commission ‘Guide to Global Business’ (2012) para 3.3.  
154 s138(2) & (8) of the Botswana Income Tax Act. 
155 s138(7) of the Botswana Income Tax Act. 
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Local Direct 
Investment  
• None • Required 
considerations in award of 
GBC 1 licence156 
• Required considerations in 
award of IFSC 
certificate157 
Tax Concessions • Exempt from 
withholding taxes on royalties, 
interest and dividends;158 
• No cross border anti-
avoidance rules: CFC, TP & 
Thin Cap;159 
• Freedom for 
operational currency & absence 
of tax on exchange gains;160 
• No capital gains on 
disposal of shares in a 
qualifying foreign company;161 
• Maximum effective 
tax rate of 3per cent, 
due to foreign tax 
credits; 
• 15per cent on taxable 
income from approved 
services & 25per cent on any 
other income;162 
• Exempt from 
withholding taxes on interest, 
royalties, dividends and 
management fees;163 
• Exempt from capital 
gains tax, except on disposal of 
Botswanan assets;164 
• Dividends received 
from 25per cent controlled 
non-residents exempt;165 
Duration/Certainty 1 year of assessment166 Indefinite Until 31 December 2020 or 
revoked167 
Treaty access Yes168 Yes, including tax sparing credit 
clauses169 
Yes, but limited number of 
DTAs170 
                                            
156 S71 (1) & (4)(b) Mauritius Financial Services Act; Financial Services Commission (note 152) para 
3.3. 
157 s138(8) of the Botswana Income Tax Ac. 
158 s49D, s50D(1)(a)(i)(cc), s64E(1) of the Income Tax Act. 
159 s31(5); s9(2) of the Income Tax Act. 
160 s25D(4) & s24I (1) of the Income Tax Act. 
161 para 64B of the Eighth Schedule of the Income Tax Act. 
162 Eighth Schedule, Table III item 7 of the Botswana Income Tax Ac. 
163 s58(4) of the Botswana Income Tax Ac. 
164 s139 of the Botswana Income Tax Ac. 
165 s38, Second Schedule Part II para (xxxvii), s1 def ‘qualifying foreign participation’ of the Botswana 
Income Tax Ac. 
166 s9I(3) of the Income Tax Act. 
167 s138(2) of the Botswana Income Tax Ac 
168 s9(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act requires potential beneficiaries to be resident in South Africa. 
169 Oguttu (note 14) at 17. 
170 Ibid. 
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Unilateral Double 
Taxation Relief 
Credit & deduction systems171 • Presumed Credit of 
80per cent of tax payable on 
foreign sourced income;172 
• Foreign Tax Credit on 
comparable Mauritian tax or 
proven tax paid;173 
 
Credit of lesser of foreign tax 
paid or as per formula174 
Exchange control Yes175 No176 No177 
 
2.4.4 The above table shows that South Africa’s LIS incorporates best practice features mainly 
geared towards IHCs. Including a broad network of DTAs, exemption from withholding taxes 
on outbound payments, unilateral double tax relief, and an absence of capital gains on disposal 
of shares in foreign subsidiaries. However, all three jurisdictions provide best practice tax 
relief along these lines. Specifically, all three provide relief on withholding taxes on outbound 
payments, access to treaty benefits, and unilateral double taxation relief in the form of tax 
credits. This increases the relative importance of the other determinant factors, both regarding 
the design of the LISs and broader market basics. 
 
2.4.5 Mauritius’ GBC 1 incentivisation programme is the most competitive in the region, as it 
provides the most tax efficient means to conduct both IHC and RHQ activities. This lies in 
the maximum 3per cent effective tax rate on foreign sourced income, resulting from the 
application of Mauritius’ brand of unilateral double taxation relief. When this is combined 
with the potential origin country tax credit savings applicable under tax sparing clauses in 
Mauritian DTAs, the tax saving grows. The absence of exchange controls allows mobility for 
funds, which is useful to intermediary holding companies. Mauritius also incorporates 
optimisation features such as certainty of duration and involvement of the implementing 
authority. The only potential detraction is the local substance requirements which must be 
                                            
171 s6 quin, s6 quat of the Income Tax Act 
172 reg 8 (3) Mauritius Income Tax (Foreign Tax Credit) Regulations 1996: GN 80 of 1996. 
173 Ibid reg 6 (1). 
174 ss63-63 of the Botswana Income Tax Ac. 
175 Financial Surveillance Department Exchange Control Manual (2015) para 6.1.4.5. 
176 Oguttu (note 14) at 17-8; Doelie Lessing & Daleen Malan ‘Private Equity Investments: SA 
headquarter company v Mauritius GBC1’ November 2014 Without Prejudice 68 at 69. 
177 Oguttu (note 14) at 17. 
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satisfied for the GBC 1 company to be managed and controlled from Mauritius. However, as 
indicated above such measures are an acceptable trade-off to the offering of tax concessions 
and provide an important guarantee of investment for developing countries.  
 
2.4.6 Botswana’s IFSC LIS is uncompetitive from a tax perspective, because it applies a relatively 
high rate of tax on qualifying income at 15per cent, the foreign tax credit provided may result 
in less than full recoupment and the network of tax treaties available is limited. It however is 
administered by an implementing authority, does not apply exchange controls and the expiry 
date for benefits was certain from the outset. It also has local direct investment requirements 
built into the incentivisation process, securing local returns. The success mentioned above 
must therefore be attributable to the combination of the IFSC with other incentives, such as a 
competitive taxation system for mining royalties.178 
 
2.4.7 South Africa’s economic dominance in the region positions it as a likely host 
jurisdiction for RHQs, but s9I does not incentivise these activities. It’s overall strength in 
financial services places it as a leading choice for IHC activity, but this is hampered by 
exchange control. To assume its place as a regional gateway into Africa, South Africa must 
focus on augmenting its inherent strengths by incentivising the activities it is best placed to 
host, namely RHQ activities. It must also lever the strategic advantage of a world class 
financial services sector to its benefit. This must however bring a return for the people of 
South Africa and aid in its developmental project, meaning returns must be guaranteed. South 
Africa therefore must consider targeting the s9I incentive towards RHQ activities with a heavy 
reliance on a strong financial sector.  
 
2.5 Conclusion on the Tax Policy Appropriateness of s9I 
 
2.5.1.  South Africa’s tax policy ought to conform with the principles laid out in the various 
government policy documents applicable for the present period.179 More importantly, South 
Africa’s tax policy and taxation authority must contribute towards the constitutional mission 
                                            
178 Jude Amos ‘Botswana: Corporate Taxation’ (2016) IBFD Country Reviews available at 
https://online-ibfd-org.ezproxy.uct.ac.za/document/gtha_bw_chaphead, accessed on 24 February 
2016 para 1.7.2. 
179 See NDP 2030 (note 11) Chs 3 & 7. 
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of achieving equality and dignity for those trapped under the blight of poverty.180 The role of 
a fiscal inventive in this context is therefore to encourage enterprises to perform activities 
which produce public goods, such as employment or state revenue. If a tax incentive does not 
do so, then it is an inefficient use of state resources. Where an incentive in fact produces 
negative consequences such as distortion of competition then it is completely contradictory 
to the goals of tax policy in South Africa and must be urgently remedied or repealed. 
 
2.5.2. This part has explored the tax policy design of the s9I regime with the aim of determining 
what types of MNE activities it is best able to attract and whether these activities are likely to 
produce the externalities required by the country. Through a comparative analysis with one 
of the world’s leading IHC jurisdictions, the Netherlands, it has been determined that s9I is 
geared towards attracting intermediary holding activities. However, this form of MNE activity 
has been shown to produce highly negative results for South Africa. First, the loss of revenue 
is not justified by a direct investment return for South Africa, because IHCs tend to be minimal 
companies carrying out little activity. Secondly, s9I violates the fundamental taxation 
principles of equality and neutrality, because it distorts competition against local MNEs which 
cannot access similar tax benefits, and therefore have to compete under a greater tax burden.  
 
2.5.3. Having established that IHC activities as incentivised by s9I would not be suitable to the 
current context of South Africa, regional headquarter company activities were investigated as 
an alternative. The active nature of the functions carried out by RHQs was found to be 
beneficial to the developmental project underway in South Africa. Therefore, the position was 
taken that South Africa ought to pursue this form of MNE activity through s9I. Singapore was 
used as the comparator for RHQs, because of its overwhelming success in attracting these 
companies. The best practice recommendations arising from this comparative analysis were 
that s9I needs to provide tax relief for the intra-group services performed by RHQs and that 
requirements for qualification need to be crafted to ensure adequate levels of local direct 
investment. Further, lessons which could benefit s9I’s policy design were also delineated from 
this comparative study including the importance of having an institution championing a LIS.  
 
2.5.4. Using the factors identified as best practices in attracting both IHCs and RHQs, s9I was 
compared to Botswana and Mauritius’ LISs. This comparison saw Mauritius coming out on 
                                            
180 ss 7 (2), 9 & 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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top, as it best embodies the best practice elements and reliably provides a very low effective 
rate of tax on foreign source income. Furthermore, it was established that for South Africa to 
assume its natural place as regional gateway, it would have to target its incentivisation efforts 
at RHQ activities which it is well positioned to host. However, it ought not to throw out the 
IHC baby with the bathwater, because these tax efficiencies, combined with its strength in 
financial services could provide the competitive edge necessary to surpass Mauritius. 
 
2.5.5. Regional treasury companies (‘RTC’) are a sub-type of RHQs which require a strong financial 
sector, but which provide the active intra-group services endemic to RHQs. RTCs thus have 
the characteristics and functions necessary to resurrect South Africa’s LIS efforts. RTCs have 
become increasingly popular with the capital mobility and currency volatility of open capital 
markets of recent times.181 These companies perform activities centring around the cash and 
financial risk management of an MNE’s activities in a particular region.182 Examples of 
typical RTC functions include: foreign exchange risk management, market and credit risk 
management, cash management, and overseeing banking relationships.183 Polak and Roslan 
conducted a literature review of work on the location criteria important for RTCs. They 
emphasise that favourable taxation is fundamental for RTCs and that this is the most important 
criterion in selecting a location.184 They find that authors generally posit that the other 
important features of RTC locations include: minimal bank transaction fees, especially on 
cross border payments; minimal withholding and corporate taxes; minimal reporting 
requirements to monetary authorities on transfers of certain volumes; a good sovereign credit 
rating; a flexible functional currency environment; and existence of other treasury centres in 
the region.185  
 
2.5.6. South Africa meets many of these structural requirements: it has a world class financial 
services and banking sector and is near to Mauritius, another prominent treasury centre. When 
the present s9I is considered, the capital mobility advantages add to South Africa’s suitability 
as a host for RTCs. The foreign currency provisions in s25D and para 45 (1A) provide the 
                                            
181 Petr Polak & Rady Roswanddy Roslan ‘Location Criteria for Establishing Treasury Centres in South 
East Asia’ (2009) 2 Journal of Corporate Treasury Management 311 at 331 (Polak & Roslan).  
182 Ibid at 331.  
183 Ibid at 332-3 
184 Ibid at 332, 334. 
185 Ibid 334-6. 
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means to convert receipts and expenditure in a foreign currency into the prospective s9I 
company or Rand. This allows for flexibility in the denomination of asset bases, which is part 
of the function of diversifying currency risk. When this is combined with the effective foreign 
exchange exemption found in s24I(1) definitions  of ‘local currency’ para (d), and ‘exchange 
difference’, read with s24I (3), this provides relief on foreign exchange gains not attributable 
to a foreign permanent establishment, denominated in the s9I companies functional currency. 
Effectively insulating the s9I company’s taxable income from exchange gains and losses. 
Also, the exemption from withholding taxes, especially on interest payments is useful for 
RTCs making cash distributions across the group.186 A further aspect of capital mobility is 
being exempt from exchange controls, which is based on similar requirements to qualification 
under s9I.187 With these features, South Africa presents a potentially competitive jurisdiction 
to host RTC activity. Relief for intra-group financial services and tweaking the foreign 
exchange gain taxation to exempt foreign exchange gains on all currencies would concretise 
this. Targeted local substance requirements could then ensure RTCs are guaranteed 
contributors to South Africa’s economic development goals. RTCs present a form of 
intermediary MNE activity which South Africa is primed to accommodate and reap the 
benefits of hosting.  
 
2.5.7. The ultimate position reached in this Part therefore is that s9I’s current policy design is 
detrimentally inappropriate for its context. Rather, it ought to be modified to properly target 
MNE activities that would provide greater local benefits. The first step towards achieving this 
would be to target RHQ activities, which can provide an economic boost to the developmental 
mission of present day South Africa through active provision of services to group companies. 
A consideration of the competition South Africa faces in the intermediary holding company 
arena, indicates that South Africa must exploit its competitive advantages effectively to gain 
ground on Mauritius. RTCs are the natural choice for South Africa, based on its world class 
financial and banking sector that provides a favourable context in which to conduct these 
activities. As subtypes of RHQs, RTCs are sound choices from a tax policy perspective. 
Section 9I’s currency fluidity, when combined with the capital mobility enabled by 
                                            
186 s50D ITA; Polak & Roslan (note 181) at 336. 
187 For a discussion of headquarter companies and exchange control see sub-part 3.5. 
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headquarter company exemptions to exchange control, provide a solid incentivisation basis 
to embark down this path.  
PART II: THE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 9I AND ITS COMMERCIAL 
ATTRACTIVENESS 
3.1 Introduction   
3.1.1. The commercial attractiveness of a fiscal incentive is intuitively based on the degree to which 
it effectively compensates for costs, which would otherwise act as a barrier to the targeted 
activities being located in a particular jurisdiction. Regardless of how well designed an 
incentive is from a policy perspective, if companies do not view it as commercially 
advantageous to participate in, there will be no positive externalities produced by their 
increased activity. Commercial attractiveness lies not only in the extent and nature of the tax 
relief provided, but also in companies’ ability to readily determine what is required to access 
the benefits, and the burden required to comply. Therefore, it is imperative that fiscal 
incentives are put forward through simple predictable rules, that do not impose unwarranted 
barriers to access and which have been drafted cognisant of the broader legal atmosphere.188 
 
3.1.2. This part seeks to determine whether s9I has been drafted in a manner that ensures the 
incentive is commercially attractive. To do so the seminal overview of the correct approach 
to interpretation propounded by Wallis JA in Natal Joint Municipal Pension fund v Endumeni 
Municipality (Natal Joint Pension Fund) will be applied to the provisions.189 This approach 
requires the interpreter to determine the meaning of the words used, based on an objective 
consideration of the context of the document as a whole and in light of all relevant 
circumstances.190 Wallis JA also endorses considering certain objective, interpretational 
factors: ordinary rules of grammar and syntax; context in which the provision occurs; its 
apparent purpose; and the material known to be responsible for its production.191 
                                            
188 Alan Auerbach ‘The Cost of Capital and Investment in Developing Countries’ in Anwar Shah (ed) 
Fiscal Incentives for Investment and Innovation (1995) 153; Jack Mintz & Thomas Tsiopolous 
‘Corporate Income Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment in Central and Eastern Europe’ in Anwar 
Shah (ed) Fiscal Incentives for Investment and Innovation (1995) 465. 
189 2012 (4) SA 595 (SCA). 
190 Natal Joint Pension Fund (note 188) para 24. 
191 Ibid para 18 
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3.1.3.  Applying the above here will require a consideration of the text of s9I and any other relevant 
provisions. Considered, conscious of the purpose of the s9I regime, as established above at 
paras 2.2.2 and 1.3: the incentivisation of holding company activities. It will also require 
consideration of the context of s9I. Wallis JA did not explicitly state what can validly be 
considered as the context of a provision, but he implied that it included the document as a 
whole and all relevant circumstances.192 Consideration of a statute in its entirety here will be 
taken as an endorsement of the interpretative  presumption that a word retains its meaning 
throughout a statute.193 The broader body of tax case law, including persuasive foreign cases, 
must be taken as a relevant circumstance, informing the meaning to be ascribed to words used 
in the same sense in multiple sections of the Act. Therefore, the words used in the provisions 
will be interpreted using their ordinary meaning, as guided by precedent on the same or similar 
words. The ordinary meaning, if it leads to ‘glaring absurdities’ must be interpreted in a 
manner which aids the fulfilment of the purpose of the provision’s IHC incentivisation.194   
 
3.1.4.  Companies seeking to make use of the s9I regime must be resident in South Africa, comply 
with the provisions of s9I(2) and make an annual election in the prescribed form.195 Section 
9I(2)’s requirements are the foundation of its commercial attractiveness, because they 
determine what is required of a company to access the scheme. Interpreting the specifics of 
these requirements will therefore expose the commercial attractiveness of the s9I regime. The 
seemingly benign requirement of an annual election interacts with the anti-avoidance 
provisions inserted through s9H. This interaction is laden with the potential to impose 
significant costs on companies seeking to elect to be treated as s9I companies and therefore 
has the potential to be a fatal deterrent. Lastly, the nature of South Africa’s DTAs and its 
exchange control rules are factors outside the ITA to be considered for their relevance to the 
efficacy, and therefore commercial attractiveness, of the scheme.  
 
                                            
192 Ibid para 24 
193 See Dlamini v S; Dladla and others v S; S v Joubert; S v Schietekat 1999 (4) SA 623 (CC) para 47. 
194 Natal Joint Pension Fund (note 188) para 25. 
195 S1 ‘resident’ read with S9 (1) of the Income Tax Act; see further Oceanic Trust Co Ltd NO v CSARS 
74 SATC 127; s9I (2) & (3) of the Income Tax Act. 
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3.1.5. As noted above the commercial attractiveness of a fiscal incentive is based upon how 
effectively it compensates for costs which would otherwise be barriers to investment. The 
interpretative analysis to be conducted of s9I and its context below raises certain recurrent 
themes. Namely, the ambiguity of the provisions; the reliability of compliance; and the 
restrictiveness or burdensomeness of the requirements – absent sufficient policy justification. 
That these concerns arise recurrently s9I (2) requirements, and are considerations in the 
broader context as well, does not bode well for the commercial attractiveness of the regime.196 
Where a fiscal incentive’s provisions itself act as a deterrent to partaking in the scheme it is 
as though the state has locked the door to the incentive from within. Therefore, rather than 
aiding in the establishment of South Africa as an entry point into Africa, the provisions of s9I 
have barred the gateway into the region from within.     
3.2 Section 9I (2)(a): the 10per cent equity shares and voting rights requirement  
3.2.1. This subsection reads: 
 
“(a) for the duration of that year of assessment, each holder of shares in the company (whether alone or 
together with any other company forming part of the same group of companies as that holder) held 10 per 
cent or more of the equity shares and voting rights in that company: Provided that in determining whether 
a company complies with the requirements prescribed by this paragraph in relation to any year of assessment of 
that company during which the company commenced the carrying on of trade, no regard must be had to any 
period during that year before which the company so commenced the carrying on of trade”, (emphasis added)  
 
3.2.2. The first requirement of this section is that compliance must be “for the duration” of the year 
of assessment (‘YOA’) in question. According to SARS Interpretation Note No. 87 (IN87) 
this means that the company must comply every day of the YOA and that the shareholding 
can change, but the 10per cent threshold must always be maintained.197  The stringency of 
this requirement proved to be a barrier to entry into the scheme for start-up companies and 
therefore the exception in the later part was introduced in 2012.198 The exception allows for 
non-compliance in the period before the prospective company has commenced carrying on of 
trade.  
                                            
196 cf Mintz (note 188) 
197 National Treasury ‘Interpretation Note No. 87’ (2016) p6 para 3.2.3. 
198 National Treasury ‘Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2012’ (2012) 
124. 
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3.2.3. Intermediary holding companies, as noted above, are mainly concerned with passive holding 
activities and their administration.199 The question therefore is whether IHCs carry on a trade 
when engaging in these activities in an intra-group context? Trade is defined as including 
‘every profession, trade, business, employment, calling, occupation or venture’, including the 
letting of property and licencing of intellectual property.200 Thus where a s9I colicences the 
use of IP to foreign subsidiaries it is clearly trading. However, where it merely holds shares 
in subsidiaries or provides debt finance the position is less clear.  
 
3.2.4. The cases interpreting what constitutes carrying on a trade are found in two main variants: 
those dealing with the distinction between capital and revenue receipts, and those dealing with 
the deductibility of expenditure.201 The cases on the capital/revenue distinction are more 
apposite to answering the question here. These cases deal with the situation where taxpayers 
begin trading or cross the Rubicon into business, where they previously held capital 
investments.202 The taxpayer’s intention morphing from passively holding or realising capital, 
into active revenue seeking is the hallmark of commencing to trade.203 The test to determine 
whether the gain is a trading gain is factual, with the activities undertaken in relation to asset 
being used to infer if the taxpayer was employing their capital in a scheme of profit making.204 
Several factors have repeatedly been used by the courts as indications either way, including 
the taxpayer’s ipse dixit, the length of time the asset was held, and the behaviour of the 
taxpayer which caused the receipt.205 However, the core criterion remains whether the gain 
arose through business operations which form part of a scheme of profit making by the 
taxpayer.206 
                                            
199 See above para 2.2.2. 
200 s1 ‘trade’ in the Income Tax Act. 
201 For capital/revenue see CIR v Stott 1928 AD 252 & Natal estates v SIR 1975 (4) SA 177 (A); for 
expenditure see De Beers Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CIR 1986 (1) SA 8 (A) & CIR v Pick n Pay Wholesalers 
1987 (3) SA 453 (A) 
202 Stott (note 199) at 259, Natal Estates (note 199) at 203. 
203 Stott (note 199) at 259 & 264; Natal Estates (note 199) at 199 & 202 -203 
204 Stott (note 199) at 259; Natal Estates (note 199) at 199 & 202 -203; CIR v Pick n Pay Share 
Purchase Trust 1992 (4) SA 39 (A) at 56G. 
205 Natal Estates (note 199) at 202; CSARS v Capstone 556 (Pty) Ltd 2016 (2) All SA 21 (SCA) para 
31.  
206 CSARS v Capstone 556 (Pty) Ltd 2016 (2) All SA 21 (SCA) para 26. 
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3.2.5. The recent case of CSARS v Capstone 556 (Pty) Ltd (Capstone) dealt with a situation where 
shares which were previously acquired and held as a capital investment were disposed of at a 
profit.207 Leading SARS to question whether the taxpayer had commenced trading. The court 
followed CIR v Stott, Natal Estates v SIR and CIR v Pick n Pay Share Purchase Trust in 
assessing the objective circumstances to determine if the taxpayer had the intention to embark 
on a scheme of profit making.208 Factors held relevant included the nature of the business 
activities engaged ordinarily engaged in by the taxpayer; the period for which the asset was 
held; and the intended duration at acquisition.209 This case is therefore analogous to the 
situation of IHCs seeking to access s9I and holding investments in foreign subsidiaries. 
 
3.2.6.  Prospective s9I companies are IHCs and as such their main functions are the holding of 
passive investments in subsidiaries. These investments are not speculative; rather, they are 
acquired with the intention to efficiently resource regional activities. They will not therefore 
be readily disposed of and are more likely to be held for substantial periods of time. These 
factors, following Capstone, are indicative of fixed capital investments which the company is 
not trading in. Furthermore, the s9I regime does not lend itself to prospective companies 
treating the investments they hold as floating capital. This is reinforced by the foreign 
dividend exemption in s10H and the capital gains exemption on the disposal of shares in 
qualifying companies in 64B of the Eighth Schedule of the ITA. With the passive nature of 
the holding activities of IHCs and thus prospective s9I companies, there is little chance that 
the behaviour of the IHCs being such that the objective inference is that they intended to 
engage in a scheme of profit making.  
 
3.2.7. It is thus possible that a prospective s9I comay never have to comply with the s9 (2) (a) 
requirement, where it does not enter the arena of trading and merely engages in passive 
holdings in subsidiaries. While not a damning flaw, this lacuna betrays poor drafting and an 
absence of appreciation for the subject matter being incentivised. It places prospective s9I 
companies in the unenviable position of having to comply, even where in law they ought to 
                                            
207 2016 (2) All SA 21 (SCA). 
208 Capstone (note 205) paras 24-8 
209 Capstone (note 205) paras 31-2 
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be able to operate free from the requirement. This ambiguity is a negative factor for MNEs 
seeking to invest, as it detracts from the clarity of the provisions of the scheme.  
 
3.2.8. In the ordinary course, s9I companies must comply with s9I (2)(a) for the duration of the 
YOA in question. However, requiring constant compliance invites the possibility that a 
prospective company may fail to comply through no fault of its own, or even without its 
knowledge. Events which could disrupt compliance in this way include: liquidation of an 
insolvent shareholder’s assets, cession in securitatem debiti of shares, and the diluting of a 
shareholding where a natural person bequeaths ownership to multiple people. Considering the 
international nature of s9I companies, the company not having full information on its foreign 
shareholdings throughout the entire YOA is possible. Added to this quandary is the absence 
of direct control by a company over its shares. The possibility that a company may make 
investments, anticipating the benefits of s9I, only to be undone by events which it had no prior 
knowledge of or control over is a major disincentive to attempting to access the regime.  
 
3.2.9. S9I(2)(a)’s second requirement dictates the broad shareholding structure of prospective s9I 
companies. Each shareholder, alone or as a group of companies, is required to hold 10per cent 
of both the equity shares and voting rights in the company. Equity shares are a defined term 
in the ITA. 210 Essentially, equity shares exclude shares which have limited or no rights to 
participate in a company’s distributions after a certain point.211 Ordinary shares will qualify 
as equity shares, because they give the right to participate in both dividends and capital upon 
winding up, without a restriction.212 Voting rights are undefined in the ITA, but are a defined 
term in the Companies Act 71 of 2008. There voting rights connote the right of a holder of a 
company’s securities to vote on a matter to be decided by the company.213 Given the parallels 
in context, this definition provides a proximate meaning for the term under the ITA. 
 
3.2.10. Requiring a concentration of both equity shares and voting rights is a restriction on the 
flexibility inherent in the bundle of rights which form a share or security.214 Prospective s9I 
                                            
210 s1 ‘equity shares’ in the Income Tax Act. 
211 Silke (note 75) para 13.23. 
212 Ibid. 
213 s1 ‘voting rights’ in the Companies Act of 71 2008. 
214 Farouk HI Cassim (ed) Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2012) 214. 
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companies should be wary of implementing financing structures which make use of 
preference shares or hybrid instruments with voting rights, as the separation of voting rights 
from equity shares could lead to a breach of the 10per cent minimum requirements. This 
rigidity is another factor which detracts from the commercial attractiveness of s9I, because it 
restricts the company from structuring its capital in a way which is strategically useful to the 
business. For example, a prospective s9I co would have to tread carefully, ensuring the group 
companies definition is satisfied, in seeking to conclude hybrid debt instruments with voting 
rights attached.215 Considering the cross-border context of this form of financing is useful to 
a group where interest payments can provide a reduction in taxable income.216 This would be 
the case where a s9I co engages in unincentivized management activities, earning fully taxable 
income and efficiently reduces this through interest payments to a related company in a 
jurisdiction with a lower tax rate. This would be a risky dilution of voting rights if the viability 
of the MNE’s investment relied on access to s9I. 
 
3.2.11. It is difficult to determine the policy utility of S9I (2)(a) in an IHC LIS. It may be a reasonable 
requirement from the perspective of a tax authority wanting to ensure that s9I companies have 
a concentrated shareholding and homogenous financing structure to aid with auditing and 
other anti-avoidance measures. However, this practical gain is insufficient to justify the 
uncertainty and structural rigidity which prospective s9I companies are saddled with, and the 
resultant disincentive imposed on participation in the regime. The case for the subsection is 
not aided by containing an exception that runs contrary to the anticipated IHC activities of 
prospective s9I companies, which creates a lacuna. Ambiguity and precarious compliance are 
not attractive aspects for commercial enterprises which value flexibility and certainty when 
investment is prompted by a fiscal incentive.  
3.3 Section 9I (2)(b): the ‘80per cent of cost of total assets attributable to’ requirement 
3.3.1. This subsection reads:  
“(b) at the end of that year of assessment and of all previous years of assessment of that company, 80 per 
cent or more of the cost of the total assets of the company was attributable to one or more of the following:  
                                            
215 s1 ‘group of companies’ in the Income Tax Act, requires the controlling company to directly hold at 
least 70per cent of the equity shares in the controlled companies.  
216 See generally on the efficiency of intra group debt finance: Jack Mintz & Alfons J. Weichenrieder 
‘Taxation and the Financial Structure of German Outbound FDI’ (2005) 1612 CESifo Working Paper 
1. 
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(i) any interest in equity shares in;  
(ii) any debt owed by; or  
(iii) any intellectual property as defined in section 23I (1) that is licensed by that company to,  
 
any foreign company in which that company (whether alone or together with any other company forming 
part of the same group of companies as that company) held at least 10 per cent of the equity shares and 
voting rights: Provided that in determining-  
 
(aa) the total assets of the company, there must not be taken into account any amount in cash or in the form of 
a bank deposit payable on demand; and  
 
(bb) whether a company complies with the requirements prescribed by this paragraph in relation to any year of 
assessment of that company, no regard must be had to any such year of assessment if the company did not at any 
time during such year of assessment own assets with a total market value exceeding R50 000;” (emphasis added) 
3.3.2. The core of this subsection requires at least 80per cent of the cost of the total assets of the 
prospective s9I co to be attributable to the assets enumerated in paragraphs (i) to (iii) in a 
qualifying foreign company. This requires a prospective company to determine both the cost 
of its total assets and the fraction attributable to qualifying assets. Cost is a seemingly simple 
and ordinary word, defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as having two main noun senses: 
“an amount… paid or spent to buy or obtain something” and “the effort, loss or sacrifice 
necessary to achieve or obtain something.”217 The word ‘cost’ in relation to assets has been 
authoritatively interpreted in an Appellate Division case and many persuasive foreign cases 
in apex courts. The essence of the interpretation is that cost ought to be given the meaning 
most appropriate to the context. The context has been identified as the legislative setting in 
which cost is used and relevant facts, often relating to the specifics of the business or 
transaction in question.218  
 
3.3.3. The two senses of cost noted above correspond to two separate manners of obtaining assets 
relevant to s9I(2)(a): purchase and creation. The scope of the cost underlying these two 
manners of obtaining assets have clear parallels to the principles from cases dealing with wear 
and tear allowances on purchased asset, and stock in trade valuations in manufacturing 
businesses respectively. Where the cost is equivalent to a price the determination is simple, 
but where there are other inputs to be considered there is a justifiable place for prevailing 
                                            
217 Angus Stevenson (ed) Oxford Dictionary of English 3 ed (2010) 394.  
218 Eaton Hall v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1975 (4) SA 953 (A) at 956. 
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accounting practice to aid in determining the cost drivers or elements are de facto relevant to 
the creation of an asset.219 
 
3.3.4. IN87 has put forward SARS’ view as the cost requirement here being equivalent to 
‘expenditure incurred’ and as a result sections which deem expenditure affect s9I (2)(b). The 
authoritative interpretations of the two, while similar, are not interchangeable. Expenditure 
does not provide as appropriate guidance on the scope of costs to be considered, particularly 
with asset creation. Lastly, the position on recoupments of cost or reduction of overall outlay 
for an asset is incorrect. Thus, the position taken by SARS unnecessarily muddies the waters. 
 
3.3.5. Having determined what cost ought to be interpreted as meaning, this subpart turns a 
consideration of the attractiveness of what is required. Valuing cost can be a very burdensome 
exercise, particularly as the requirement must be satisfied for every past YOA, on all assets. 
The requirement is also susceptible to being inadvertently not complied with due to 
unexpected asset acquisitions or increased outlay costs. Thirdly, while the imposition of the 
cost requirement is intended to limit the activities of prospective s9I companies, however it 
also disincentives direct investment into South Africa. Lastly, while compliance may be 
burdensome, the group context presents the opportunity to avoid the requirements through 
donations or manufactured costs between related parties. Therefore, the lack commercial 
appeal in this burdensome and ineffective requirement is clear. Its continued existence in a 
fiscal incentive given the local detriment it engenders must be questioned.  
 
3.3.6. The most authoritative case on the meaning of cost in the context of the ITA is Eaton Hall v 
Secretary for Inland Revenue (Eaton Hall).220 In Eaton Hall, the Appellate Division was 
called to decide whether several allowances granted “in respect of the cost to the taxpayer... 
of the portion of any building” included the interest paid on a loan used to finance 
construction. Trollip JA held that in absence of a definition, ‘cost’ was to be given its ordinary 
meaning.221  Judicial notice was taken of the meaning per the Oxford English Dictionary 
                                            
219 Cost drivers or elemets here will be used to indicate the instances of expenditure which go to make 
up the cost of a particular asset. 
220  1975 (4) SA 953 (A). 
221 Eaton Hall (note 219) 956F-G 
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which defined cost as: "That which must be given or surrendered in order to acquire, produce, 
accomplish, or maintain something; the price paid for a thing."222  
 
3.3.7. Trollip JA also made use of both the broader background and specific provisions of the ITA, 
to determine the purpose of the provisions as encouraging the building and improvement of 
hotels.223 Enabling the interpretation of cost of any portion of any building as referring to the 
erection cost of hotel buildings.224 Two textual interpretive points were decided informing the 
scope of cost. The use of the phrase ‘cost of’, as opposed to ‘cost in respect of’ denotes a 
close, direct connection between the cost and item in question.225 Secondly, “any building” 
and “any improvements” was held to indicate a more direct relationship between the asset and 
the cost, than simply the cost of building.226 Overall, the court held that the ordinary, 
grammatical meaning of the words used in the provision indicated that the relevant cost was 
limited to the consideration given or price paid for the erection of hotel buildings.227 As this 
was required to be a direct and close connection, the indirect interest expense could not be 
said to be part of the cost of erecting the buildings.228 
 
3.3.8. Following Eaton Hall, the immediate textual context is fundamental to determining the 
parameters of the meaning of cost in the provision.229 The core requirement of s9I (2)(b) is 
that the costs attributable to qualifying assets make up a certain fraction of the cost of the 
company’s ‘total assets’. This phrase uses cost as referring to both the cost of qualifying assets 
and the cost of total assets. Therefore, the cost of all the assets, including foreign assets, held 
by a prospective s9I co must be determined annually.230 The words ‘attributable to’, indicate 
that there must be a causal link between the cost drivers and the specific assets going to make 
                                            
222 Ibid 956F-G 
223 Ibid 956F 
224 Ibid 956F 
225 Ibid 956H 
226 Ibid 956H 
227 Ibid 957A 
228 Ibid 957D 
229 Ibid 956H 
230 Asset is not defined in s1, but is defined para 1 of the Eighth Schedule as including both property, 
corporeal and incorporeal, and rights or interests in such property and this will be the meaning adopted 
here.  
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up the 80per cent minimum. Meaning a prospective s9I co must then determine what 
proportion of its total costs are attributable to qualifying assets. The choice to use the phrase 
‘cost of total assets’, rather than ‘total cost of assets’ is notable. The former phrase emphasises 
the totality of the assets rather than of the cost. Implying that the cost refers to the sum of each 
instance of asset acquisition, calculated at a certain point. Total cost would imply the inclusion 
continuous or maintenance costs up to the point of calculation. Further, it is submitted that 
‘total’ here ought to be read as indicating only the currently held assets of the prospective 
company, because although the criterion must be satisfied for every past YOA, the calculation 
is being done at the end of ‘that YOA’. Therefore, to comply the company must determine 
it’s the cost of its total asset base at a point in time, using historical acquisition costs and 
determine whether 80per cent of these costs were incurred in relation to qualifying assets.  
 
3.3.9. Trollip JA relied on no direct authority for his interpretation of the scope of cost in Eaton 
Hall. However, several foreign cases cited by counsel in Eaton Hall are instructive on what 
cost elements one ought include within the cost of an asset. C v Commissioner of Taxes (C v 
COT) dealt with the deductibility of expenses related to export market development.231 It was 
held that where cost is undefined it may be used in various senses and therefore the context 
in which it is used is determinative of the sense intended.232 The context is also determinative 
of the extent of items to be included in an instance of cost. That is whether only the direct 
costs necessary to bring the res into a vendible state are to be included or whether a proportion 
of the business’ ancillary costs ought to be factored in.233 Goldin J noted that an amendment 
had been effected to the relevant provisions reversing the effect of a case which had 
interpreted them as including indirect costs, such as railage and insurance.234 Also, the 
provision contained an exhaustive list of specific inclusions of indirect cost drivers.235 It was 
therefore held that the direct costs were all that could be deducted.236 
 
                                            
231 1973 (4) SA 449 (R) at 449H. 
232 Ibid at 453F & 454B. 
233 Ibid at 453E. 
234 Ibid at 453H & 454D. 
235 Ibid at 454C. 
236 Ibid at 454B. 
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3.3.10. The principles informing how to determine the makeup of the cost of a particular asset can be 
traced to these three cases: Ex Parte Brierley, Re Elvidge (Ex Parte Brierley),237 The Lord 
Mayor, Alderman and Citizens of the see The Lord Mayor, Alderman and Citizens of the City 
of Birmingham v Barnes (HM Inspector of Taxes) (Birmingham v Barnes),238 and Ostime (HM 
Inspector of Taxes) v Duple Motor Bodies Ltd (Ostime v Duple).239  
 
3.3.11. Ex Parte Brierley per Jordan CJ was cited in C v COT as authority for drawing the distinction 
between applying the direct cost and on-cost methods, in varying contexts. It was held that 
the ordinary meaning of cost can connote a different scope depending on context.240 When a 
manufacturing business is determining its cost, this would be the price paid for inputs such as 
raw materials and wages paid.241 This would be determined using the on-cost method which 
would allocate a proportion of the indirect or overhead costs of manufacturing to a particular 
asset.242  While with retailers the cost would be the price paid for acquiring the merx.243 
However, in both cases the cost may include ‘all other expenses related to bringing into 
existence or obtaining’ and then turning a res to profit.244  
 
3.3.12. Birmingham v Barnes was cited by counsel for the Secretary in Eaton Hall as informing what 
‘actual cost of plant and machinery meant’ in the context of a taxing statute. It interpreted cost 
where used as a basis for a depreciation allowance on a train line constructed by the taxpayer. 
Lord Atkin held that ‘actual cost’ “meant nothing more than the cost accurately 
ascertained.”245 Further, that the cost to a taxpayer was what they paid or expended for the 
erection of the capital asset, regardless of whether a third party had contracted to pay the 
taxpayer an equivalent sum.246 This establishes that the sense of cost applicable to acquisition 
of assets is the price paid for the merx. In the context of s9I this would be applicable where 
                                            
237 (1947) 47 N.S.W.S.R. 423. 
238  1935 (1) A.C. 292. 
239 (1961) 1 W.L.R 739. 
240 Ex Parte Brierley (note 236) at 427. 
241 Ibid. 
242 Ibid at 426. 
243 Ibid at 427 
244 Ibid. 
245 Birmingham v Barnes (note 237) 298. 
246 Ibid.  
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the company buys shares, purchases a right to intellectual property or borrows funds to on 
lend to a qualifying foreign company. Ergo, acquisition of qualifying assets by a prospective 
s9I is analogous to the situation of a retail business described in Ex Parte Brierley. 
 
3.3.13. There is a parallel between cost being equated with price in the acquisition of assets and the 
use of acquisition cost as a base value for wear and tear deductions provided for in the ITA, 
where the proviso in s11(e)(vii) does not apply.247 This parallel ratifies the claim that the scope 
of cost relevant to purchased assets is the cost price, with little room for other direct costs. It 
also allows insight into the likely practical interpretation by SARS. Under the 
abovementioned provisions of the ITA, cost has been interpreted as the cost to the taxpayer, 
viz the purchase price.248 SARS has issued Binding General Ruling 7, under s89 of the Tax 
Administration Act 28 of 2011, setting practice regarding s11 (e) to treating value as denoting 
the taxpayer’s cost of acquisition in a cash transaction, without finance charges.249  
 
3.3.14. Applying the above to the analogous circumstances of s9I(2)(b) cost, where qualifying assets 
are acquired through purchase the price paid alone would constitute the cost of the asset. For 
example, with the purchase of qualifying shares the labour and office related costs of setting 
up the transaction are indirect and would not be considered part of the cost, unless specifically 
included in the contract price. While with the borrowing of funds to on lend as qualifying 
debt, interest would be a direct cost as it is consideration for the loan. This would conform 
with the strict version of the direct cost method applied in C v COT and the classification as 
per Ex Parte Brierley. 
 
3.3.15. Ostime v Duple was cited in C v COT in support of the distinction between manufacturing 
and retail costs drawn in Ex Parte Brierley.250 The case’s relevance is that it dealt with the 
valuation of stock on hand of a manufacturing business, as being the cost to the taxpayer.251 
The court was asked to decide if the direct cost or on-cost method should in principle apply 
                                            
247 Silke (note 75) para 8.117; these amendments deem the specific parameters of cost including that 
it is to be at an arm’s length price, in cash and are inapplicable to s9I see s11(e)(vii).  
248 ITC 1546 (1992) 54 SATC 477 at 481. 
249 Binding General Ruling 7 at 3. 
250 C v COT (note 230) 453G. 
251 Ostime v Duple (note 238) at 750-1. 
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to determine the cost to a taxpayer engaged in manufacture.252 It was decided that the direct 
cost method ought to continue to apply in casu as this was established practice.253 Notable 
obiter dicta for present purposes include that the costing method which gives the most 
accurate reflection of the value of stock for the particular business is the correct method to be 
applied.254 Further, while manufactured assets have a more complex cost base than purchased 
assets, potentially including what the court termed factory and office costs, the precise content 
is difficult to prescribe in principle.255  
 
3.3.16. Where assets are created by the taxpayer the second sense of cost denoting the effort expended 
can be relevant, because the manufacture of an asset has a broader set of inputs. Some of these 
may not be readily reduceable to a specific sum of money. For example, the cost of producing 
qualifying intellectual property may include the use of scientific equipment and the mental 
exertion of employees. Both of these cost elements could be engaged in multiple aspects of 
the business making the allocation of a portion of the cost to the intellectual property difficult, 
if at all possible. Useful guidance can be found in the cases dealing with the valuation of 
trading stock in the ITA.  
 
3.3.17. The scope of a mining company’s production or acquisition cost of trading stock, in the 
context of s23F(3), has recently been considered in ITC 1847.256 There the court was called 
to decide whether mining and certain related costs were part of the acquisition costs of 
fluorspar stock in trade.257  The related costs included processing costs, extraction and 
separation, and delivery costs, such as railage and insurance.258 Although it was conceded that 
delivery costs were not acquisition costs, it was held that only the processing costs constituted 
part of the acquisition cost of the fluorspar. Willis J cited George Forest Timbers and Foskor 
as authority for the proposition that they constituted acquisition costs, because they were part 
of getting the article into a saleable state.259 
                                            
252 Ibid at 746 & 750. 
253 Ibid at 749 & 754-755. 
254 Ibid at 755. 
255 Ibid at 751 & 754. 
256 73 SATC 126; at the time of the case this provision was s23F (2) of the Income Tax Act. 
257 ITC 1847 para 10. 
258 Ibid para 12. 
259 Ibid 1847 para 12 
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3.3.18. Where a prospective s9I co engages in research and development towards intellectual property 
to be licenced, lends funds out of its capital or cash surplus, or incorporates a qualifying 
foreign company, it creates the asset and acts analogously to the manufacturing business 
described in Ex Parte Brierley. The cases dealing with the valuation of stock in trade, as well 
as Ex Parte Brierley, are clear endorsements of the on-cost method in the case of asset 
creation. However, which inputs will be taken as relevant to a particular asset still remains a 
challenging determination.260 Section 22(3)(a) stipulates how the relevant inputs there are to 
be determined and this is through application of International Financial Reporting Standard 
practices. This could serve as a possible means to assist in ascertaining which input costs are 
relevant in the context of s9I. 
 
3.3.19. Several cases warn of the subordinate role of accounting standards in determining the scope 
of cost in a taxing statute. For example, in Sub-Nigel Ltd. v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 
(Sub-Nigel),261 it was held that “the Court is not concerned with deductions which may be 
considered proper from an accountant's point of view or from the point of view of a prudent 
trader, but merely with the deductions which are permissible according to the language of the 
Act.”262 However, applying generally accepted accounting standards can have utility within 
the bounds set by the law.263 This has been recognised and s22 (3)(a)(i) requires the 
application of International Financial Reporting Standards in the determination of the indirect 
costs applicable to trading stock. 
 
3.3.20. International Accounting Standard 2 (IAS 2) is the International Financial Reporting Standard 
(IFRS) presently applicable under s22(3)(a)(i).264 It allows the inclusion of indirect costs 
which are necessary for bringing an asset to its present condition and location, both where it 
                                            
260 Richards Bay v CIR 1996 (1) SA 311 (SCA) at 328. 
261 1948 (4) SA 580 (AD). 
262 Ibid 588. 
263 Noting the profit basis of taxation prevailing in the United Kingdom at the time see further Whimster 
& Co. v Inland Revenue Commissioners 1926 S.C. 20, where it was held that accounting practice 
ought to be observed in so far as it does not violate the provisions of the statute. 
264 IFRS Foundation ‘International Accounting Standard 2: Inventories’ Available at 
http://www.frascanada.ca/international-financial-reporting-standards/resources/unaccompanied-
ifrss/item45598.pdf., accessed on 20 September 2016. 
52 
 
is purchased and acquired, but not with financial instruments.265 The precedent of Eaton Hall 
is likely to bar the application to purchased qualifying assets, but given the complex nature of 
determining the input costs it ought to be of assistance with the cost of asset creation.  As the 
cost of asset creation is embedded within the broader cost structure of a given company, the 
relevant input costs and their significance may differ in each business.  Following the 
guidance of precedent and IAS 2 it is likely that costs necessary to bring the asset to its present 
location and state will be accepted as part of the cost of the creation of these assets. In 
Richards Bay this was obiter stated to include labour and materials.266 However, as 
demonstrated below, this is not definitive in all circumstances.267 Therefore, even with the 
assistance of accounting standards the cost arrived at can be challenged as inaccurate or 
inappropriately composed.   
 
3.3.21. On the approach detailed above the cost of qualifying assets under s9I may carry either sense 
of its ordinary meaning, as guided by the factual context. It will always mean what was given 
by the prospective s9I co for the asset, but the scope of what has been given for the asset is 
dependent on whether it has been purchased or created. This difference has been judicially 
and administratively interpreted as allowing only the purchase price for acquired assets, but a 
broader set of costs to be included in the computation where assets are created. Therefore, the 
categorisation in Ex Parte Brierley is sound in the context of s9I: the direct cost method is 
applicable to purchasing qualifying assets, while a version of the on-cost method is applicable 
to assets produced by the prospective s9I co. 
 
3.3.22. Interpretation Note 87 puts forwards SARS’ position on the interpretation of the s9I regime. 
The position taken on s9I(2)(b) leaves much to be desired. The claim is made that ‘cost’ here 
is equivalent to ‘expenditure incurred’.268 Further, that sections which deem expenditure 
actually incurred should be taken as altering the cost relevant for s9I(2)(b).269 However, on a 
consideration of the meaning of cost as established above propositions are unsound.  
 
                                            
265 Ibid para 6 & para 2. 
266 Richards Bay (note 259) 328. 
267 See para 3.3.28. 
268 IN87 (note 195) at 11. 
269 Ibid at 12 
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3.3.23. Despite the wealth of precedent available on the meaning of cost SARS has chosen to interpret 
cost in s9I (2)(b) as equivalent to expenditure incurred, relying on Labat v CSARS (Labat).270 
Expenditure is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as “the action of spending funds” 
and “the use of energy, time or other resources”.271 Expenditure has received a significant 
amount of judicial attention in cases dealing with the general deductions formula, but Harms 
AP in Labat held that it is used in its ordinary sense.272 Expenditure and cost differ in their 
semantic emphasis, with the crux of cost being the obtaining of something for a price or effort. 
While expenditure’s focus is on the action of spending. Expenditure, as a tax law concept, has 
limited application when considering the cost of a particular item. It gives no principled 
indication as to how to associate an instance of expenditure with a particular asset. 
Furthermore, cost has a broader scope than expenditure and may be reduced by receipts in 
relation to an asset; Knights Deep v Colonial Treasurer (Knights Deep) is a case in point.273 
There the Colonial Treasurer had argued that the ‘cost of production’ for a gold mining 
company would be reduced by the proceeds from the sale of water pumped out of shafts in 
order to make them accessible.274 However, the court disagreed, because ‘cost of production’ 
was a defined term which limited the cost to amounts ‘actually expended’.275 Mason J stated 
that the definition of production cost was a deviation from its ordinary commercial meaning 
in the context.276 
 
3.3.24. Based on the view that cost and expenditure are interchangeable under s9I(2)(b) IN87 posits 
that there is an interaction between this section and deeming provisions such as s40C, s31(2), 
section 80B and paragraph 38(1)(b). These sections form part of the broader legislative 
context and therefore must be considered. However, as IN87 correctly states each relevant 
section must be interpreted to determine whether it applies to s9I.277 For example, s12C(2) 
begins with “for the purpose of this section” and therefore, the deemed arm’s length price for 
these assets does not extend beyond this section. However, contrary to SARS’ view, where a 
                                            
270 2013 (2) SA 33 (SCA); IN87 at 11. 
271 Oxford English Dictionary (note 216) 615. 
272 Labat (note 269) para 12. 
273 1905 TS 689. 
274 Ibid 693. 
275 Ibid. 
276 Ibid. 
277 IN87 (note 195) 12 
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section deems an adjustment to taxable income or expenditure actually incurred, s9I should 
not be affected. For example, where a notional adjustment is made to a taxpayer’s taxable 
income under 31(2), contrary to the position of IN87, this would not affect the cost to be 
calculated under s9I. However, should a provision of the Act generally apply a deemed 
adjustment to cost, then this would be a valid adjustment under s9I (2)(b). 
 
3.3.25. IN87 states that cost under s9I will not be affected by amounts given under provisions of the 
ITA, such as capital allowances.278 Capital allowances are remote from the price paid or 
production costs to the taxpayer, so it is likely that this position is sound. However, IN87 goes 
on to state that recoupments from the “other party to the potential” s9I co will reduce the 
original cost of an asset.279 No authority is cited for this curious proposition and it runs 
contrary to persuasive precedent in the context of asset purchase. In Birmingham v Barnes, it 
was held that the cost to the taxpayer was what had been expended in satisfaction of the price 
and contractual payments by interested third parties, although affecting the overall outlay by 
the taxpayer, did not go to reduce the purchase cost.280 Indeed, considering Ryan v Asia Mill 
even where the taxpayer makes a payment increasing the overall outlay regarding an asset the 
cost price remains the cost.281 The position may be different in the context of asset creation, 
because following Knights Deep the recoupments of input costs in the production of gold, 
through the sale of by-product water would have gone to validly reduce production costs in 
their ordinary, commercial sense.282 
 
3.3.26. Although interpretation notes are not binding, SARS’ poor guidance on s9I (2)(b) is still 
detrimental to the commercial attractiveness of the regime. It goes to the ease of understanding 
what is required by a prospective company to access the regime. If the guidance provided by 
the administrative entity responsible for the scheme is out of sync with the applicable law, 
then a prospective s9I co would be torn between complying with the standards set by SARS 
and what is required by the law. 
 
                                            
278 Ibid 12. 
279 Ibid 12. 
280 Birmingham v Barnes (note 237) 296. 
281 Ryan (HM Inspector of Taxes) v Asia Mill Ltd 32 T.C. 275 298. 
282 Knights Deep (note 272) 693. 
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3.3.27. Having established the meaning of cost as used in s9I (2)(b), it falls to investigate whether 
this requirement is a deterrent to making use of the scheme and whether it adds value from 
the perspective of achieving the IHC incentivisation objective of s9I. Whether requiring the 
determination of the fraction of total asset costs made up by qualifying assets is attractive will 
turn on what a company must do to ascertain this. It is submitted that a prospective s9I co 
would have to determine the cost of its total assets, corporeal and incorporeal worldwide, 
using the judicially endorsed cost model relevant to how the assets were acquired. It would 
then determine whether the proportion of cost drivers attributable to the acquisition cost of 
qualifying assets meets the 80per cent minimum. Although accounting standards may be of 
assistance, it would have to be ensured that the prescriptions are in line with the meaning of 
cost in law under s9I.283  
 
3.3.28. Where assets are purchased the determination of cost may be relatively simple, as the case 
law indicates the price should be used.284 It becomes a complex task where assets are created 
by the taxpayer, because the correctness or proportion of the cost drivers that go into that 
determination cannot be selected with absolute certainty.285 Drury states the costing systems 
implemented by companies’ accuracy is relative to their cost.286 He argues that traditional 
costing systems, which the majority of organisations adopt, are designed to fulfil financial 
accounting requirements and ‘rely extensively on arbitrary cost allocations’.287 More 
sophisticated systems, termed activity based costing systems, however still rely on a measure 
of arbitrariness to determine the scope of indirect costs relevant to a particular product.288  
However, an measure of arbitrariness is necessarily present under either system, because it is 
impossible to accurately determine the proportion of overheads that are more remote to the 
asset. For example, where a senior executive’s effort and decision are the causa causans of a 
company producing specific intellectual property, it is prohibitively difficult to calculate what 
proportion of their salary ought to be considered an indirect expense in production. 
 
                                            
283 It must be noted that unlike s22, s9I does not explicitly endorse the use of accounting standards 
284 Eaton Hall (note 219); Where the price is variable or is determinable as prescribed in the contract 
this becomes more difficult. 
285 Colin Drury Management and Cost Accounting 8 ed (2012) 45-6. 
286 Ibid 47-8. 
287 Ibid 44-7.  
288 Ibid 49 -51. 
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3.3.29. This is aggravated by the fact that prospective s9I companies would not be creating goods 
that fit neatly fall into standard models of determining manufacturing cost which tend to 
disregard more remote indirect costs and focus on ‘factory expenses’.289 Determining the cost 
of intellectual property would be the most directly analogous to manufacturing businesses and 
perhaps International Accounting Standard 38: Intangible Assets could assist. However, for 
example, would the cost of creating an equity shareholding asset be restricted to the 
registration fee, pre-incorporation expenses and starting capital, or would it include the labour 
expense of the staff deciding on and carrying out the incorporation and the associated office 
overheads? It is impossible to say with certainty what would be accepted by SARS or a court. 
Therefore, significant effort and cost could be required to determine the cost of a creating a 
qualifying asset using the on-cost method and it would still not provide a certain result given 
the generality of the judicial decisions in this area.  
 
3.3.30. Aside from the practical determination being difficult, there are some logical tensions inherent 
in the construction of the provision. S9I (2)(b) requires the calculation of the cost of total 
assets and the proportion which qualifies, at the end of each YOA of the company from 
incorporation. Although at first glance this seems simple: requiring the taxpayer to add up all 
the acquisition costs of its currently owned assets. This requires comparison of both purchased 
and produced asset, across various time periods. Ergo, the taxpayer must compare costs which 
are differently composed, at times when the value of money may not be the equivalent. This 
is a logical inconsistency, because it requires comparing costs which are differently composed 
in the case of differently acquired assets. Further, across different time periods the 
measurement unit has changed, because assets acquired in earlier periods would have lower 
nominal costs, despite being of the same value as assets acquired later, given the time value 
of money.290 Practically, this comparison means a prospective s9I co would have to be wary 
of acquiring new, non-qualifying assets. Furthermore, requiring compliance from the 
company’s inception invites the problems which could arise where unexpected cost relating 
to non-qualifying assets arise or a court decides that indirect costs in fact are attributable to 
non-qualifying assets. Given the comparison across different time periods, the effect of 
                                            
289 Ibid 49-51. 
290 Moshe Shekel The Timing of Income Recognition in Tax Law and the Time Value of Money (2009) 
19, describes this theory as stipulating that ‘the sum of money represented in a certain nominal values 
at one point in time is not worth the same at another point in time’ 
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unexpected increases in the cost of non-qualifying assets in a later period is disproportionately 
reckoned in relation to older qualifying assets. This consideration vying with commercial 
considerations is not likely to be attractive to companies, because it restricts the operational 
freedom.  
 
3.3.31. The fact that s9I companies operate as intermediaries in holding chains is an important 
consideration. In this context, the acquisition of assets is unlikely to be at an arm’s length 
consideration. Furthermore, none is applied where s9I companies are acting as conduits given 
s31(5). Therefore, the acquisition costs of purchased qualifying assets are fully open to 
manipulation with parent companies free to donate assets or even charge inflated prices. Thus, 
groups can manipulate compliance and artificially ensure that s9I companies have qualifying 
assets with high acquisition costs. This is particularly so, because s9I does not incorporate 
anti-avoidance stipulations on cost such as those found in s11(e)(vii). Simply, requiring the 
cost to be calculated as that of an arm’s length transaction, in cash would prevent this 
manipulation by making use of a more objective cost, as is the case s11(e)(vii). 
 
3.3.32. The ability for prospective companies to relatively easily avoid this requirement, as with s9I 
(2)(a) above, indicates a lack of appreciation for the subject matter being incentivised and 
clouds the compliance requirements. Furthermore, this requirement is part of the core 
provisions of the s9I regime which limit the prospective companies to engaging in IHC 
functions. From the perspective of the state, artificial compliance means that the intended 
policy goal of incentivising regional holding activities could be undermined. A s9I co could 
have non-qualifying assets which have a greater value than qualifying assets, but comply 
because the former were donated by its holding company. Therefore, using cost to limit the 
asset base of s9I companies is ineffective as a policy tool.   
 
3.3.33. As indicated above the requirement does not effectively restrict the asset base of prospective 
s9I companies and therefore does not achieve the activity limiting purpose. However, as 
demonstrated above at sub-part 2.2 incentivising IHC activity would not be a beneficial thing 
for South Africa in any case. Restricting the asset base of s9I companies may be an active 
disincentive to investment into assets in South Africa. Only in limited circumstances would 
assets productively applied locally go towards satisfying the s9I(2)(b) 
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3.3.34. Overall, while s9I (2)(b) does include some good points such as the provisos relating to cash 
and the early stages of the company, cost remains difficult to determine and open to 
manipulation. Despite legal parameters being set through Eaton Hall and other relevant 
precedent, prospective s9I companies still cannot reliably predict compliance. Despite using 
the judicially endorsed indirect or on-cost method and applying accepted accounting practice, 
the cost figure arrived at may be susceptible to challenge by SARS. It would be open to SARS 
to argue that the cost arrived at by the taxpayer was not appropriately determined as a cost 
driver was inappropriately factored in or relevant cost drivers omitted. Conversely, SARS 
would not be able to challenge the price set between related parties, because judicial precedent 
has established that in the case of purchased assets the cost is the price paid.  
 
3.3.35. The unpredictability of compliance under this section is intuitively a disincentive to 
prospective participants in the s9I regime, because it does not allow for reliable planning. 
Reliable access has been noted as a factor in the success of Singapore’s incentivisation efforts 
and s9I ought to ensure certainty as far as possible. Furthermore, requiring constant, historical 
compliance is a stringent measure which is can be faulted in logic and practice. Therefore, 
given that this requirement is burdensome to the taxpayer, runs contrary to the stated policy 
goals of South Africa and is in any event ineffective in the context, its continued place in the 
s9I regime must be questioned.  
3.4 The Annual Election & Section 9H of the Income Tax Act 
3.4.1. Despite the difficulties involved in complying with the s9I(2) requirements, only gaining 
access to the regime for a YOA at a time, and potentially being deemed to have a significantly 
increased taxable income are the most detrimental factors impacting the commercial viability 
of s9I.  It is clear from s9I(1) read with s9I (3) that a prospective s9I company must elect into 
headquarter company status and that this is only effective for a single YOA. Ergo, prospective 
companies must make the election annually. A single YOA is a very short period of time for 
a company to be assured of tax relief and this is a fundamental flaw of the regime. Added to 
this, under s9H of the ITA, entering the s9I regime entails a deemed disposal of all the 
prospective company’s assets, in every YOA that a company elects to be a headquarter 
company. Moreover, it acts as a direct contradiction to the provisions core to the 
incentivisation of IHC activities.  Given that fiscal incentives by definition provide tax relief, 
potentially swelling the taxpayer’s taxable income is deeply counter-intuitive. Few companies 
would be willing to risk having to absorb such a tax cost annually, where there are readily 
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available alternatives within the region which provide greater tax relief, potentially for an 
indefinite period. Therefore, fearing that s9I would ravage South Africa’s tax base Parliament, 
guided by National Treasury, has robbed s9I of the core of its commercial appeal: a decreased 
group tax burden.  
 
3.4.2. On the surface, the annual election required by s9I(1), read with s9I(3), seems to be a benign 
administrative process. Indeed, the election in a taxpayer’s ITR14 return and populating the 
required RCHO01 schedule, is administratively simple.291 Under s9I (3) this election is valid 
from the beginning of the YOA it is made in. Therefore, considering s9I in isolation all that 
would be required is to submit the prospective s9I co’s tax return as normal and include the 
required schedule. Although not a major administrative burden for the company, the concern 
remains that a company would not ever be assured of accessing the relief for the lifespan of 
its investment, or even a significant portion thereof.  
 
3.4.3. Above at para 2.3.14, 2.4.5, and 2.4.6, it was indicated that other holding company LIS’ 
provide guaranteed access for a certain period, even if compliance is a prerequisite for 
continued benefit.  It is submitted that MNEs value this certainty, because it enables medium 
or even long term planning of their investments into a jurisdiction. Should the company fall 
outside s9I the regime after having arranged its affairs to take advantage of the tax relief, it 
would be saddled with a significant tax cost. For example, it may no longer benefit from 
exemption to the CFC rules leading to an attribution of the income of foreign subsidiaries.292 
Moreover, the tax cost would spread further up the holding chain, as repatriation payments 
would now be subject to withholding taxes.293 Thus, by not incorporating any reasonable 
levels of certainty detracts from the commercial attractiveness of s9I and makes the regime 
less competitive viz regional competition. 
 
3.4.4. Section 9H (3)(a) provides for a deemed disposal to a resident, of all the assets of a resident 
company, on the date immediately before it becomes a headquarter company. Further, it is 
deemed to have reacquired those assets, at market value, on the day which it becomes a 
                                            
291 s9I(1) has empowered the Minister of Finance to prescribe this as the manner and form of election. 
292 s9D(1) ‘controlled foreign company’ of the Income Tax Act. 
293 see s49D, s50D(1)(a)(i)(cc), s64E(1) of the Income Tax Act. 
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headquarter company.294 The tax effect of this deeming is likely to be nil with revenue assets. 
These would be disposed of retaining their nature leading to inclusions in gross income, but 
a corresponding deduction ought to be available upon the deemed re-acquisition.295  However, 
with capital assets there is a capital gain or loss following the disposal, depending on the 
difference between the base cost and market value, but no corresponding deduction upon 
reacquisition.296 Therefore, when capital assets are subject to s9H the taxpayer is faced with 
an effective tax cost equivalent to the  18.65 per cent of the gain.297 This can be a heavy burden 
for a prospective s9I co to bear, because due to s9I (2)(b) they are shepherded towards largely 
holding capital assets. Therefore, s9I companies may be susceptible to costly inclusions where 
the capital assets are not excluded from capital gains calculation and appreciate in value.  
 
3.4.5. IN87 claims that where a capital gain or loss is realised on the deemed disposal of equity 
shares in foreign companies, where the taxpayer holds at least 10per cent of the equity shares 
and voting rights, paragraph 64B will operate to nullify the capital gain.298 While this is a 
correct statement of the law, it is a minor consolation when the full implications of s 9H (3)(e) 
are considered. Although, the section states that it applies when ‘a company ceases to be 
resident’, this done is with a reference to para (a). De Kocker and Williams posit that this does 
not operate to limit the section and that it applies where resident companies become 
headquarter companies.299 This section operates to deem an inclusion of all the capital gains 
excluded by para 64B in the preceding three years. Essentially, therefore the protection 
afforded to s9I companies on the disposal of share in qualifying companies is nullified where 
a company disposes of such shares and elects into headquarter company status within the 
following three years. This consequence is highly detrimental to the regime, as the para 64B 
exemption forms part of the core suite of tax relief incentivising the establishing of 
headquarter companies. 
 
                                            
294 s9H(3)(a) of the Income Tax Act. 
295 s1 ‘gross income’, s11(a) & s23(g). 
296 Para 3, para 4 & Part V of the Eighth Schedule of the Income Tax Act. 
297 paras 8 & 10 of the Eighth Schedule of the Income Tax Act, read with para 2 Schedule 1 of the 
Rates and Monetary Amounts Amendment of Revenue Laws Act 13 of 2016. 
298 IN 87 (note 195) 57. 
299 Silke (note 75) para 14.2. 
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3.4.6. A parallel argument applies to s9H(3)(f) which deems an inclusion of the foreign dividends 
not subject to inclusion in taxable income under s10B for three preceding years. This may be 
even more of a deterrent, because the likelihood of receiving dividends from subsidiaries is 
greater than that of disposing of a qualifying shareholding. Therefore, the risk of an increased 
tax burden and disincentive effect is greater with the application of s9H(3)(f). 
 
3.4.7. Section 9H (3)(c)(iii) operates to deem a company becoming a headquarter company, to have 
declared and paid a dividend in specie, equal to the market value of all issued shares, less the 
amount of its contributed share capital. This implies a dividends tax cost for the s9I co, 
calculated 20 per cent of the difference between the contributed share capital and market value 
of its equity. IN87 states that the beneficial owner exemptions in s64F(1)(a) will operate to 
exempt this deemed payment, because it is deemed to be distributed to a resident.300 Although 
the effect of this may be valid in specific circumstances, this is not generally applicable. 
Section 64F(1)(a) is only applicable to a dividend distribution ‘to the extent that it does not 
consist of a dividend in specie’. Section 64FA then provides that where a company declares 
and pays a dividend it is possible for this to be exempt then to the extent that this constitutes 
a dividend in specie, and this would have been exempt under s64F but for it being a dividend 
in specie. However, this requires s64FA(1)(a) to be satisfied and the person to whom the 
payment is made has timeously submitted the requisite declaration from the beneficial owner. 
Alternatively, s64FA applies where the distribution is made to a beneficial owner that is part 
of the same group of companies as defined in the ITA.301 Therefore, although it is possible 
for the s9I co to escape liability this is not a given and requires an administrative burden on 
the part of the beneficial owners of the dividends. Despite the s9H dividend in specie likely 
fulfilling the requirements of s64F(1)(a), as it deemed to be distributed to residents.  
 
3.4.8. Given that the election is annual and attends such unfavourable tax consequences on 
headquarter companies the combined effect of the provisions is a fatal disincentive to the 
attractiveness of the scheme. Not only can it nullify the tax relief achieved through the 
operation of other sections, but given s9H (3) (e-f) the relief granted under the scheme is 
actively eroded. This state of affairs is clearly not attractive to prospective s9I companies 
which seek to enjoy the benefits of a fiscal incentive which provides a tax saving for the intra-
                                            
300 IN 87 (note 195) 58. 
301 s1 ‘group of companies’. 
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group activates inherent in intermediary companies. The Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2012 states that s9H was introduced an anti-avoidance 
measure to protect South Africa’s tax base from former residents avoiding capital gains tax.302 
Without any specific justification it goes on to state that ‘The above rules also apply when a 
company becomes a headquarter company.’303 Given the drastic effect this provision has on the 
viability of the s9I regime it is submitted that more is required than the tacking on of a provision onto 
another anti-avoidance provision. Further, that by revoking the proffered tax relief through s9H 
(3)(3-f) the provision goes beyond what is required to protect the tax base.  
3.5 Section 9I’s Interaction with Double Tax Agreements, Foreign Tax Systems & 
Exchange Control 
3.5.1. The interaction of s9I with the greater legal atmosphere in force in South Africa is important 
to its likely success in achieving the tax relief which is the central drawcard of any fiscal 
incentive, s9I included. As shown above in the discussion on Dutch IHCs, the ability for a 
LIS to beneficially interact with double taxation agreements to reduce withholding taxes is a 
crucial aspect to its commercial appeal. It therefore remains to determine the range of benefits 
a prospective s9I co can expect to reap through South Africa’s DTA network. Secondly, 
Watanabe argues that the effect of a LIS can be to reduce a company’s tax liability or basis 
for taxation to such a point that it triggers anti-avoidance rules in the parent company’s 
jurisdiction.304 The extent to which this hold true is important for the commercial 
attractiveness of the regime, but even negative consequences may be ameliorated if the 
relevant DTA contains a tax sparing clause. A last facet of the legal terrain which is likely to 
have a great effect on the efficacy of s9I is the exchange control regime administered by the 
South African reserve bank.  
 
3.5.2. To access treaty benefits a taxpayer has to be engaged in cross border activity leading to the 
drawing of income from a source, which is not its resident jurisdiction. As s9I(1) requires that 
prospective headquarter companies are residents this aspect is satisfied. However, as the 
context is a fiscal incentive which seeks not to tax, the applicability of treaty provisions in the 
absence of double taxation arises. The Appellate Division did not disturb the findings of the 
                                            
302 National Treasury (note 196) 109-110. 
303 Ibid. 
304 Watanabe (note 12) at 100. 
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court a quo per Miller J that ‘such [double tax] agreement need not be confined to therapeutic 
measures, but may include prophylactic measures as well.”305   
 
3.5.3. Having established that s9I companies can access treaty benefits, it remains to determine the 
nature of the benefits they stand to access. As noted above the key criterion sought by 
prospective s9I companies would be low applicable withholding tax rates, both for s9I cos 
making and receiving cross border payments. An exclusive right to tax the conduit activity in 
South Africa or a reduced rate under a DTA with a source country would be beneficial to s9I 
cos receiving payments. A reduced rate is also important in the context of outbound payments, 
however the exemptions to withholding taxes in South Africa provided for by s9I will be of 
little value if the resident country of the receiver could then impose a tax on the receipt.  
Table 2: Withholding Rates for Major African Economies306 
Country Dividends Interest Royalties Exclusive 
Right 
Algeria 10per cent where 
25per cent capital 
holding and 15per 
cent otherwise 
10per cent 10per cent None 
Botswana 10per cent where 
25per cent capital 
holding and 15per 
cent otherwise 
10per cent 10per cent None 
Egypt 15per cent 12per cent 15per cent None 
Mauritius 5per cent if 10per 
cent capital holding, 
10per cent otherwise 
10per cent 5per cent None 
Nigeria  7.5per cent   
 
                                            
305 Unreported decision of the Natal Income Tax Special Court of 27 October 1972, see further SIR v 
Downing 1975 (4) SA 518 (A). 
306 GG 21303 of 21 June 2000 Arts 10-12; GN 39485 in GG 21303 of 11 December 2015 Arts 10-12; 
GN 471 in GG 38862 of 17 June 2015 Arts 10-12; GN in  GG 19706 of 22 January 1999 Arts 10-12; 
GN31241 in GG 31241 Arts 10-12. 
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3.5.4. Table 2. shows that the applicable reduced rates are fair and generally represent a 5per cent 
reduction in the rate applicable in South Africa.307 The articles used in the above DTAs do 
not provide an exclusive right to South Africa, because they all make use of a phrase similar 
to ‘may also be taxed in the Contracting State of which the company paying the … is a 
resident’.308 Therefore, the tax benefit while good is not optimal. Moreover, there are a 
number of key African states which South Africa is yet to sign treaties with, limiting the reach 
of the regional relief available to s9I cos. The states include: established economies like 
Angola and Libya, but also emergent resource rich economies such as Equatorial Guinea and 
Gabon. Therefore, inbound payments to s9I cos will be subject to some level of withholding 
tax in payable in the source state.  
 
3.5.5. The suboptimal outcome of applying the DTAs increases the importance of unilateral double 
taxation relief, specifically s6quat of the ITA. Where a taxpayer has suffered a foreign tax on 
taxable income not sourced in South Africa, South Africa provides unilateral double taxation 
relief through s6quat.309 This relief is in the form of a rebate on tax payable, limited to the 
proportion that the foreign tax proven payable, bears in to the total taxable income; applying 
the relevant tax rate to the result.310 The utility of this provision in the context of s9I is that 
even where DTAs do not go to reduce the full amounts of withholding tax on inbound 
payments, the s9I company can still gain relief for its tax cost. Therefore, effectively with 
inbound payments s9I produces the best possible result, eliminating the tax cost. Considering 
the emphasis placed on the importance of reducing withholding taxes by authors such as 
Weyzig and Weichenrieder the incorporation of this is likely to be seen as attractive to MNEs. 
Table 3: Withholding Rates for Major Global Economies311 
                                            
307 For example, dividends tax is levied at 15per cent s64E (1). 
308 GG 21303 of 21 June 2000 Arts 10.1-10.2; see further OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs Model 
Tax Convention on Income and Capital: Full Version (2015) para c(10) II  4. & c(10) II 9.; these 
commentaries were held to be authoritative in Downing (note 304). 
309 s6quat (1)(a) of the Income Tax Act. 
310 s6quat (1A), s6quat (1B) of the Income Tax Act. 
311 GN 31721 in GG 31721 of 23 December 2008 Arts 5-7; Proc R. 125, 1973 of 25 May 1973; GG 
22041 of 2 February 2001; & GG 24335 of 31 January 2003, read with GN 52 in GG 34971 of 2 
February 2012. 
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Country Dividends Interest Royalties Tax Sparing/ 
Exclusive 
Right 
Australia 5per cent where 
beneficial owner 
holds 10per cent of 
voting power, 10per 
cent otherwise 
10per cent 5per cent None 
Germany 7.5per cent where 
25per cent of voting 
shares, 15per cent 
otherwise 
10per cent Full resident 
country rate 
Royalties;  
China  5per cent 10per cent 10per cent of full 
amount or 10per 
cent on 70per cent 
of gross payment for 
use of equipment 
 
United Kingdom 5per cent with 10per 
cent capital holding; 
15per cent viz 
property Investment 
company; & 10per 
cent otherwise 
Full residence 
country rate 
Full residence 
country rate 
Interest & 
royalties 
 
3.5.6. Section 9I cos do not fare as well regarding outbound payments, with a tendency for DTAs 
with more powerful states, such as Germany and the United Kingdom, to incorporate 
exclusive rights to tax in the state of residence. Therefore, the tax relief of not charging 
withholding taxes in outbound interest of royalty payments to the UK is irrelevant. However, 
for YOAs beginning after March 2016, s6quat again plays a supporting role. Under 
s6quat(1C), where a resident carries on any trade within South Africa which results in their 
being subject to foreign tax, that taxpayer may elect to pursue a deduction of those tax costs.312 
This deduction is limited to the total taxable income attributable to foreign sourced income 
and a proportion of the deductions under ss11(n), 18 and 18A must be included where 
applicable.313  
                                            
312 s6quat(1C)(a) of the Income Tax Act; see further Silke (note 75) para 17.22. 
313 s6quat(1C)(b), read with s6quat(1C) of the Income Tax Act. 
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3.5.7. Although s6quat does go a-ways towards addressing the shortcomings of DTA relief for s9I 
cos, as noted above, Watanabe argues that the preferential treatment could bring on foreign 
anti-avoidance provisions such as CFC rules.314 For example, considering the rules of the 
Dutch participation exemption mentioned above under para 2.2.7?? this may not apply in 
relation to s9I companies, as the restricted effective tax base may lead the Netherlands s9I cos 
as a ‘low-taxed, investment company’.315 This brings forth the importance of preserving the 
benefits achieved by s9I through tax sparing clauses in DTAs with developed countries, likely 
to host parent companies. Tax sparing clauses are designed to preserve the benefits of fiscal 
incentives offered by preventing bars to foreign tax credits on incentivised income in the 
parent company’s jurisdiction. These are often applied by requiring the credits to be calculated 
on the notional amount of tax that would have been paid without the incentive.316 Despite the 
potential benefits for the s9I regime, South Africa shown an inclination towards abandoning 
tax sparing clauses, due to their potential to allow for double non-taxation.317 Mauritius 
conversely continues to make use of tax sparing clauses in several of its DTA to the benefit 
of its GBC 1 companies, which are assured that the Mauritian tax relief will not be nullified.318 
Tax sparing credits are a missed opportunity to bolster the appeal of s9I, by ensuring the group 
tax benefit is not nullified by an increased tax cost in the parent company’s jurisdiction. 
 
3.5.8. Lastly, although the capital mobility critical to conduit functions of qualifying s9I cos is not 
restricted by exchange controls, having to fulfil a distinct set of requirements with a separate 
controlling body is not optimal. The intention at the inception of the s9I regime was that 
exchange control regulations would approximate its requirements. The two regimes have been 
coming closer together over time, but there is still not a perfect match. The requirements per 
para 6.1.4.5 of the Exchange Control Manual, adds the requirement that no more than 20per 
                                            
314 Watanabe (note 12) at 100. 
315 art 13 of the Dutch Income Tax Act; see further Schelkens (note 34) para 2.2. 
316 Legwaila (note 46) 10. 
317 National Treasury, Media Statement: New South Africa and Mauritius Tax Treaty Enters into Force’ 
(2015) 2; see on the negative effects of tax sparing Annet Wanyana Oguttu ‘The Challenges of Tax 
Sparing: A Call to Reconsider the Policy in South Africa’ Bulletin for International Taxation (2011) 65 
Bulletin of International Taxation 1. 
318 Legwaila (note 46) 10. 
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cent of the headquarter company’s shares may be held directly or indirectly by residents.319  
Further, the requirement relating to headquarter company’s foreign asset base is worded 
differently, focusing on the assets and having no regard to their cost.320 Prescribing different 
prerequisites adds to the already extensive compliance burden faced by the prospective s9I co 
both administratively and substantively. To qualify for the exchange controls which are 
critical to its holding functions, it will likely have to determine the market value of its assets 
to evidence compliance, while being restricted to a 20per cent local shareholding, which could 
have commercial value. Therefore, although the exchange control requirements are clearer 
and less taxing than those of s9I, they still go to compound the heavy compliance burden 
faced by prospective s9I companies.  
3.6 Assessment of s9I’s Commercial Attractiveness 
3.6.1. The basis of commercial attractiveness for a fiscal incentive has been argued to consist of 
the ability for the incentive to reduce costs which would otherwise tip the scales away from 
investment in a jurisdiction.321 Section 9I’s purpose is the attraction of IHC MNE activity 
which would otherwise not view South Africa as a viable location for holding activates. To 
do so, s9I needs to be simple, to ensure companies are confident in their knowledge of the 
requirements. It must also provide reliable access to the benefits, because without assured 
access to tax relief South Africa can be assured that this will not arise. The last criterion to 
successful incentivisation is an absence of prohibitive costs for access to the tax relief 
proffered.  
 
3.6.2.  Section 9I (2)’s requirements all indicate a level of anti-avoidance, beyond what is validly 
required to limit the activities of s9I cos. With s9I (2)(a) the requirement to have a 10% 
equity share and voting right holding minimum for each shareholder is likely geared towards 
assisting SARS with the implementation of anti-avoidance measures. Requiring a 
consolidated holding structure serves little other purpose than to limit the scope of an audit. 
This is particularly so, because by their nature IHCs are embedded in holding chains, 
meaning the probability that there would be a vast array of shareholders is slim. Therefore, 
                                            
319 Financial Surveillance Department Exchange Control Manual (2015) para 6.1.4.5. 
320 It is submitted that this is a more appropriate approach, which would have the effect of calculating 
the asset base using an arm’s length price, as noted above at para 3.3.???. 
321 Op cit (note 188) 
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concretising this requirement has led to it serving as a barrier to entry into the regime. In 
recognition of this, the Act was amended to provide a proviso to the requirement. This 
proviso has been shown to be open to manipulation, because IHCs are not active trading 
companies. Their activities consist largely of holding capital assets, rather than embarking 
on schemes of profit making.  In sum, s9I (2)(a) does little to improve the policy design of 
the regime and is both ambiguous and precarious; leading to it detracting from s9I’s 
commercial attractiveness. 
 
3.6.3. Section 9I (2)(b) prima facie has some utility in the regime, by restricting the asset base of 
prospective s9I companies the provision seeks to limit their activities to holding. This is 
consonant with the underlying purpose chosen by National Treasury for the scheme. 
However, not only does requiring a specified level of asset cost not limit the activities of 
companies, but a deeper analysis of the core requirement of the section brings forth its true 
colours. It is an unwieldy provision which is smacks of illogicality and the accurate 
determination of asset cost in relation to total asset cost can be prohibitively intricate, 
making compliance burdensome for the prospective companies. Furthermore, given the 
group context and absence of enforcement of arm’s length principles it is susceptible to 
manipulated compliance through donations or inflated costs being constructed between 
related parties, which both have the same objective: a decreased tax burden. In sum, s9I 
(2)(b) also falls short of properly regulating the activities of s9I companies, while being 
ambiguous to a fault 
 
3.6.4. A counterargument which could immediately be levelled against the above is that the 
interpretation leads to an ambiguity justifying a detraction from the ordinary meaning of the 
language. However, as Wallis JA Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund a difficult result does 
not necessarily warrant a detraction from the ordinary meaning. In essence, the provisions 
while bordering on absurdity fall short and are merely burdensome to comply with. Given 
the burdensome nature of these provisions, it is possible to argue that the contra fiscum 
presumption of interpretation ought to operate to lighten the burden of compliance. Although 
an unlikely prospect give  Milne J’s finding that  
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“The mere existence of hardship or inequity resulting from the application of the plain provisions of 
fiscal legislation is beside the point. Hardship and inequity are not to be used for the purpose of 
reading into plain terms a meaning which they do not otherwise bear”322  
 
A further consideration is whether companies have the litigative appetite to test if the 
requirements are absurd or ought to be interpreted contra fiscum.  
 
3.6.5. Considering the broader legislative context s9I fares little better. Its interaction with DTAs 
while beneficial when considering countries in the region likely to operate as source countries, 
South Africa lacks the kind of DTAs which would truly bring a LIS scheme to life. When s9I 
companies repatriate to parent companies, the likelihood is that the articles present in the 
relevant DTA would either limit the reduced rate of withholding very low or bar South Africa 
from taxing altogether. In the ordinary course this would be beneficial, but seeing as s9I cos 
are exempt from withholding taxes this is not optimal for their tax burdens. 
 
3.6.6. South Africa’s DTAs also do not provide any protection to the parent company’s foreign tax 
credits applicable to income derived from s9I companies. Given the proposed limited tax base 
s9I companies could be viewed as low tax entities by other jurisdictions leading to a decrease 
in the abovementioned tax credit, thereby nullifying much if not all of the benefit. 
 
3.6.7. Therefore, while the benefits of the scheme are set up to be attractive to MNEs wishing to 
make use of a conduit for financing operations and repatriating profit, S9I loses its lustre 
because compliance is ambiguous and precarious; and the annual election makes the benefit 
far too temporary and costly. However, the gateway is remains open a crack. The provisions 
of s6quat effectively compensate for some of the shortcomings of South Africa’s DTAs, by 
providing credits. Further, the continued approximation of s9I and exchange control 
requirements is an indication that this critical aspect of the regime is being considered with 
due gravity. 
OVERALL CONCLUSION 
4.1. South Africa has decided that an element of the remedy to its merge developmental progress 
is to be found in fiscal incentivisation. However, as Part I demonstrated, it has adopted an 
                                            
322 Badenhorst v CIR 1955 (2) SA 207 (N) at 215A. 
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inappropriately designed incentive for its stage of development. Section 9I incentivises 
passive holding activities, requiring little to no local substance and in fact doing real harm to 
both the region and local MNEs struggling to compete on an uneven footing.  
 
4.2. However, South Africa’s core imperative, the Bill of Rights, requires that the state ‘protect, 
promote and fulfil’ the rights contained therein.323 Thus, allowing people to languish in 
squalor is not an option for any government presiding over this constitutional democracy. 
National Treasury therefore is under an injunction to pursue policies which enable South 
Africans to enjoy their constitutional rights. 
 
4.3. Part I has argued that South Africa ought to adopt the model of incentivisation used by 
Singapore in the 1990s: offering reliable, effective tax relief in return for requiring 
strategically tailored local substance. This would ensure that the incentivised activities 
produce direct results towards economic upliftment.  
 
4.4. S9I is also commercially unattractive, because its provisions are ambiguous, compliance is 
burdensome and uncertain, and there is a regular, high tax cost given the annual election. It 
would even be open to government to design requirements for transformation, the 
empowerment of women or rural development. The crux however is targeting the appropriate 
activity so that these requirements are not out of place. Furthermore, an increase in the number 
of active companies will produce externalities beyond the substance requirements.  
 
4.5. Given South Africa’s regional dominance and strategic advantages, such as a strong financial 
sector and world class regulation thereof, RHQs are the obvious choice. These companies 
provide intra-group services, requiring actual employees and ancillary services. Thus, South 
Africa is amenable to hosting RHQ activity, allowing scope for the imposition of substance 
requirements.  To embark down this path s9I would have to include tax relief for intra-group 
services, such as marketing and strategic management, which are at the core of RHQ 
functions. 
 
4.6. However, South Africa is not the only jurisdiction in the region seeking to reap the benefits 
of MNE activity and whatever LIS it puts forward will have to compete with able competition 
                                            
323 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa s7 (2). 
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from jurisdictions like Mauritius. Therefore, if RHQs are selected as the type of MNE 
intermediaries to incentivise then retaining IHC elements of existing s9I would be an added 
incentive. Additionally, these elements are necessary to target the type of RHQ which South 
Africa is the best suited to hosting and benefitting from: RTCs.  
 
4.7.  RTCs conduct currency management related functions, which are heavily reliant on a sound 
finance and banking sector. This is an area where South Africa is overwhelmingly dominant 
in the Southern African region. To the point where it’s financial institutions can compete with 
developed country’s institutions. South Africa has also shown itself as willing to host these 
activities, because s9I cos already benefit from capital mobility and exchange gain relief. 
Therefore, in order to concretise this position South Africa ought to explicitly seek out these 
activities by having a clearly targeted incentive for RTCs. 
 
4.8. Incentivisation is not an exact science however and the factors which make South Africa a 
prime location for both RHQ and RTC activity, could lead to a waste of state resources. Given 
the dominance of South Africa in the region, it is likely that many headquarter companies are 
already located in South Africa. Were the state to then offer tax relief as an incentive, existing 
companies would seek to benefit. The absence of new investment would mean the incentive 
is subject to a deadweight loss or redundancy cost. 
 
4.9. However, the core tenant of the model of incentivisation adopted by Singapore guards against 
this by requiring a quid pro quo for incentivisation. The counterbalance to a deadweight loss 
is requiring substance, which will compensate for the unproductive outlay under the incentive 
with savings from RHQs providing public goods such as employment.  
 
4.10. The position taken in this work regarding the tax policy appropriateness of s9I is that 
incentivising IHC activity is unsuitable to producing what South Africa seeks by providing 
fiscal incentives: economic development which penetrates the society. Therefore, it ought to 
reassess and pursue MNE activities it ought to allow through its gateway into Africa. These 
should provide tangible benefit, guaranteed through legislative substance requirements. 
 
4.11. Substance requirements will not produce results sought after if the legislation is not soundly 
drafted. Part II has argued that for a fiscal incentive to be attractive to MNEs it must 
effectively compensate for costs which would otherwise be prohibitive to the investment. An 
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incentive which is based in provisions which are do not readily indicate what is required for 
compliance, which cannot be reliably be complied with through the intended actions of the 
MNE, and which impose a relatively high cost, administrative or monetary, on access to the 
tax relief, would not conform to the definition of an effective fiscal incentive. 
 
4.12. The present provisions of s9I have been drafted without a careful consideration of their effect 
on the reasons MNEs seek to make use of fiscal incentives: to decrease their group wide tax 
burden and thereby increase profitability. Leaving the impression that protecting South 
Africa’s existing tax base was the driving consideration behind the drafting, rather than 
expanding the tax base through the increased economic activity attendant to MNE activity. 
 
4.13. The two provisions of s9I (2) interpreted above both demonstrate the negative elements 
enumerated above. Section 9I(2)(a) restricts the capital structure of prospective s9I 
companies, robbing them of the flexibility necessary to acquire finance from the most efficient 
quarter. While s9I (2)(b) attempts to restrict s9I cos activities by limiting their asset base. It 
however does so in an oblique manner by restricting the cost of the total assets of the company, 
which brings with it an extensive cost in determining the cost. Importantly, both provisions 
have wide lacunas which entail that despite the burdensome compliance s9I companies can 
avoid them without deviating from their intended activates or place in a holding chain. 
 
4.14. A final nail in the coffin of s9I is the annual election, read with s9H’s anti-avoidance 
provisions. Rather than providing a reliable benefit, these provisions provide a reliable burden 
for s9I companies. Not only will they not be secure in access to tax relief, but they will be 
deemed to not have received the relief even where they had run the labyrinth of compliance 
with s9I through the operation of s9H(3)(e-f).  
 
4.15. In conclusion, in order to achieve its developmental goals and provide its people with the 
opportunity to live with equal measures of dignity the South African state must pursue every 
avenue to push for economic growth with a deep impact. This ought to be the motivation that 
underpins the drafting and if avoidance is the concern, then explicit provisions designed to 
deal with the mischief ought to be implemented. As South Africa cannot afford to lock out 
the opportunity that is presented by targeted MNE activity.  
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4.16. Overall, South Africa could truly benefit from MNE activity and is a prime location to 
successfully incentivise it. By pursuing the forms put forward here, without being fixated on 
the potential base erosion, there is the potential for incentivising activities which MNEs are 
interested in locating in South Africa and that would provide economic benefits. Throwing 
open gateway which has been sealed by the misdirected provisions of s9I is in the broader 
interest of the country and will aid in ensuring that the victory over apartheid does not ring 
hollow in the stomachs of South Africa’s people. 
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